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INTRODUCTION
Historically, most penal laws in the United States were not afforded
extraterritorial application.1 For the most part, the locus of the criminal
activity determined the place of prosecution.2 This premise, however,
has become like the hearsay rule, with more and more exceptions
diluting the initial rule.3 Today, globalization has taken U.S. law
enforcement to a point where many prosecutions are premised upon
conduct occurring outside the United States.4 It is common for federal
prosecutors to proceed against individuals who are located outside the
United States and who have perpetrated crimes beyond the borders of
I LEA BRILMAYER, AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISDICTION IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL
SYSTEM 336 (1986).
2 The United States, however, did have consular courts in some countries with the
purpose of prosecuting U.S. citizens who committed crimes in those countries. Consular
courts no longer exist. See EDWARD M. WISE & ELLEN S. PODGOR, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 241 (2000) (discussing history of consular courts).
' See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98-100 (1922) (discussing circumstances
when criminal statutes can have extraterritorial application). Since Bowman, courts have
expanded the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws. See, e.g., United States v. Pamess,
503 F.2d 430, 439 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding extraterritorial application of enterprise element of
RICO statute); United States v. Cotton, 471 F.2d 744, 750 (9th Cir. 1973) (permitting
prosecution for theft of government property that occurs outside United States).
4 See infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
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this country.5 Computers present a new issue for consideration in
determining the extraterritorial application of United States criminal
laws. At first blush, the universal speed and accessibility of computers
would seem to make computer-related crimes appropriate for broad
extraterritorial jurisdiction. After all, a touch of a mouse by a person in
one country can be destructive and criminal in another country. As
stated by former Attorney General Janet Reno, "[a] hacker needs no
passport and passes no checkpoints. ,6 Criminal computer conduct that
occurs outside the United States can easily affect those within the United
States. When this happens, some might argue that the United States
should be able to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over the
perpetrator.
Further reflection, however, reveals problems with having such a
broad exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Should the United States
acquire jurisdiction of all criminal activity when the medium for the
crime involves the use of a computer, and the activity has an effect in this
country? Should every "I Love You" 7 type worm or virus that invades
the United States be the source of a criminal prosecution within this
country? When computers are involved in the criminal activity, the issue
of extraterritorial application is not simplistic. Whether one standard
should apply to all computer crimes, whether the focus should be on the
See generally WISE & PODGOR, supra note 2, at 28-178 (describing array of different
federal offenses that prosecutors have used for conduct occurring outside United States).
6 Former U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno, Keynote Address at the Meeting of the P-
8 Senior Experts' Group on Transnational Organized Crime (Jan. 21, 1997), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/agfranc.htm. "One of the President's
working groups repeated this metaphor in its report on cybercrime. PRESIDENT'S WORKING
GROUP ON UNLAWFUL CONDUCT ON THE INTERNET, THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER: THE
CHALLENGE OF UNLAWFUL CONDUCT INVOLVING THE USE OF THE INTERNET, 21 (Mar. 2000)
[hereinafter ELECTRONIC FRONTIER], at http://www/usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime
/unlawful.pdf.
' The estimated cost of damages to businesses worldwide resulting from the "I Love
You" virus was $6.7 billion dollars. Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section
(CCIPS) of the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, Frequently Asked
Questions and Answers About the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, A.4.
(Dec. 1, 2000), at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/COEFAQs.htm; see also Lev
Grossman, Attack of the Love Bug, TIME, May 15, 2000, at 49 (stating that "I Love You" virus
caused estimated $10 billion in damages). The "I Love You" worm is just one email virus
that has been internationally followed. CHIPS to Fight Cybercrime, TIMES UNION, July 31,
2001, at B3, available at 2001WL 24802478 (stating that "Melissa" virus caused more than $80
million in repairs). See Kevin Johnson, 'Mafiaboy' Trying to Stare Down Prosecutors, USA
TODAY, Dec. 5, 2000, at 10A (discussing sixteen-year-old Canadian who hacked into
websites and caused estimated $1.3 billion in lost business); Nancy Parello, 'Melissa' Created
By N.J. Man, Officers Say, ATLANTA J. & CONSr., Apr. 3, 1999, at IF.
20021
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criminal act as opposed to the medium used to commit the act,8 and
whether the location of the alleged perpetrator or victims should control,
are just some of the many issues for consideration.
This Article undertakes a re-evaluation of the basic principles of
international criminal jurisdiction to assess whether United States
extraterritorial application is warranted in cases involving computer
fraud.9 The Article is limited to one segment of computer criminality,
namely, fraud, but offers considerations that may likewise serve as a
starting point for resolving the many jurisdiction issues that accompany
computerization. 10 It is important to note, however, that issues of
cyberterrorism and issues that directly affect the self-defense of the
United States raise a host of other considerations that are not the focus of
this Article." Although this Article discusses some of the ongoing
international discussions related to jurisdiction with respect to computer
issues,12 it focuses on national law issues that can remain irrespective of
' See Robert J. Sciglimpaglia, Jr., Comment, Computer Hacking: A Global Offense, 3 PACE
Y.B. INT'L L. 199, 213 (1991) (discussing "ends" and "means" approaches to hacking).
' This Article does not explore issues of cyberterrorism or the cooperative efforts that
the United States has instituted to protect its "critical infrastructure." See National Security
Advisor Rice Says It's Time to Prepare for Cyber-Terrorism, 1 Cybercrime L. Rep. (P & F) No 1,
at 6 (Apr. 9, 2001).
0 This Article limits its scope to federal jurisdiction, although it recognizes that many
of the questions regarding extraterritoriality can arise in state prosecutions that involve
conduct occurring outside the United States. See Terrence Berg, www.wildwest.gov: The
Impact of the Internet on State Power to Enforce the Law, 2000 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1305, 1327-36
(2000) (discussing extraterritorial state jurisdiction of Internet crimes). Nor is limiting this
Article to federal actions meant to diminish the importance of state prosecutions that might
involve extraterritorial conduct falling within the United States' borders. See Stephan
Wilske & Teresa Schiller, International Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Which States May Regulate
the Internet?, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 117 (1997) (discussing regulation of cyberspace by states).
This Article also excludes from its discussion computer-related conduct of foreigners within
the United States. Jurisdiction of these offenses is presumed since the locus of the crime is
within this country. See Day Trader Convicted of Charges of Stock Manipulation by Internet, 1
Cybercrime L. Rep. (P & F) No. 1, at 5 (Apr. 9, 2001) (discussing Internet securities fraud
case of Canadian citizen who resided in Houston).
" Principles of necessity and proportionality, as opposed to questions of jurisdiction,
may guide military responses in self-defense to terrorist acts. See, e.g., Robert J. Beck &
Anthony Clark Arend, "Don't Tread on Us": International Law and Forcible State Responses to
Terrorism, 12 WIs. INT'L L.J. 153 (1994) (discussing United States' response to Iraqi
government's attempt to assassinate Former President Bush); Military Responses to
Terrorism, 81 AM. SOC'Y INT'L. L. PROC. 287 (1987) (discussing proposed responses to recent
increases in terrorism directed against Americans). The question of whether
cyberterrorism warrants a military response is beyond the scope of this article.
2 International initiatives offer strong possibilities for future cooperation. Ad hoc
tribunals and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court offer an increased
progression toward an international recognition of the need to control crime from a global
perspective. U.N. GAOR Int'l L. Comm., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
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the adoption of international treaties. 3
This Article commences by providing an understanding of what will
be encompassed within the term "computer fraud." The discussion
turns next to United States federal extraterritorial jurisdiction in the
prosecution of computer fraud acts that occur outside the borders of this
country. Two avenues warrant consideration here. One examination
focuses on the appropriateness of extraterritorial application under the
explicit language of the pertinent criminal statute and congressional
intent. A second examination looks at the appropriateness of
extraterritorial application under international bases of jurisdiction.
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (July 17,1998), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/index.
html. These international tribunals, however, usually include only a limited number of
crimes. Although a computer crime may in fact be a crime against humanity or war crime,
and therefore encompassed within the tribunal, classic computer fraud acts are beyond the
existing language found in these tribunals. See, e.g., id. Treaties, meetings, and conferences
that consider computer crime from a global perspective are also emerging. See JEREMY
BRANSTEN, World: G-8 Countries Tackle Cybercrime, RADIO FREE EUROPE, WEEKDAY
MAGAZINE, (May 19, 2000) (discussing meeting of G-8 countries to discuss cybercrime),
available at http:/ /www.rferl.org/nca/features/2000/05/f.ru.000519122559.html; UNITED
STATES-CANADA COOPERATION AGAINST CROSS-BORDER TELEMARKETING FRAUD, REPORT OF
THE UNITED STATES-CANADA WORKING GROUP TO PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON AND PRIME
MINISTER JEAN CHRtnEN,(Nov. 1997) [hereinafter U.S.-CAN. WORKING GROUP] (examining
incidence of telemarketing fraud between United States and Canada and suggesting ways
to address it), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/uscwgrtf/index.html. Recently,
the Council of Europe produced a convention on cybercrime that may offer significant
advancement toward global cooperation. Comm. of Experts on Crime in Cyber-Space,
Council of Europe, Draft Convention on Cybercrime, approved by Eur. Comm. on Crime
Problems, 50th Sess., June 18-22, 2001, Doc. No. CDPC(2001)17 [hereinafter Draft
Convention], available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/cadreprojets.htm. This
convention would require signatory countries to establish specific substantive and
procedural laws for computer related offenses. Id. at ch. II, §§ 1-2. The Convention also
provides for international cooperation. Id. at ch. III. United States businesses have
expressed opposition to this convention. U.S. Business Interests, Rights Groups Still
Dislike Internet Crime Treaty Draft, 1 Cybercrime L. Rep. (P & F) No. 6, at 14 (June 4, 2001)
(quoting Jeffrey Pryce, international lawyer with Steptoe & Johnson, who stated "that
businesses have three major concerns with the proposed treaty - the apparent
criminalization of ordinary activities, third-party liability, and burdensome and invasive
interception requirements"). Id. In the process of waiting for international solutions,
courts should not leave decisions on how to regulate this conduct to prosecutorial
discretion. Permitting individual prosecutors to make decisions regarding when an
extraterritorial crime will be prosecuted would allow for inconsistency and inaccuracy
within the law. See Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of Prosecutors in
Discretionary Decisions, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1511 (2000).
" Treaties do not always resolve issues regarding the boundaries of national law. See,
e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 663-66 (1992) (holding that United
States-Mexico Extradition Treaty did not preclude abducting individual from Mexico to
stand trial in United States).
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Irrespective of the criminal statute that is the source for the
prosecution, the international bases of jurisdiction can easily be satisfied
when the medium for the criminal act is a computer and the victims of
the crime reside in the United States. But should traditional
considerations in determining extraterritorial application permit the
United States to prosecute computer fraud crimes that occur outside this
country? The ease of use and worldwide accessibility of computers raise
questions as to whether the traditional methodology for determining
extraterritorial jurisdiction should apply. Noting the ramifications of an
expansive reading of extraterritorial jurisdiction, this Article stresses the
importance of tempering prosecution of extraterritorial computer fraud
acts.
I. CRIMINAL COMPUTER FRAUD
Globalization has made the topic of extraterritoriality a significant area
of interest. Prior to examining extraterritorial application, however, it is
necessary to note the context in which this discussion will take place.
The discussion of extraterritoriality can take on a different complexion,
oftentimes dependent upon the crime committed. As the following
section will show, the importance of precision in discussing
extraterritoriality is particularly pronounced with respect to cybercrimes.
A. Computer Crime
There is no generally accepted definition of the term "computer
crime." 14 Internationally, there is a continuing debate "on just what
constitutes a computer crime." 9 The most recent draft of the Convention
on Cyber-Crime includes an array of different computer related offenses
in its substantive criminal law provisions. 6 For example, one section
14 See RICHARD W. ALDRICH, CYBERTERRORISM AND COMPUTER CRIMES: ISSUES
SURROUNDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME 11-30 (USAF Inst.
For Nat'l Sec. Studies, Information Operations Series, INSS Occasional Paper 32, Apr. 2000)
(discussing various international definitions of computer crimes), available at
http://www.usaafa.af.mil/inss/ocp32.doc.
15 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF CRIMINAL POLICY - UNITED NATIONS MANUAL ON THE
PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF COMPUTER-RELATED CRIME, UNCJIN, 8th U.N. Congress,
Nos. 43 & 44,at 4, available at http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/irpc4344.pdf.
1" The Draft Convention on Cybercrime includes sections on "Offenses against the
confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems," "Computer-
related offenses," "Content-related offenses," and "Offenses related to infringements of
copyright and related rights." Each of these categories also may include subsections. Draft
Convention, supra note 12, at ch. II, § 1, tits. 1-4.
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that relates to "computer-related offenses" is subdivided into articles on
computer-related fraud and computer-related forgery. 7
The difficulty of defining "computer crime" arises partly because
computers can serve many different roles in criminal activities.' They
can be the "object" used to commit the crime, 9 the "target" of the
criminal activity, or tangential to the crime. 21 Further, the enormity of
different criminal conduct associated with computer crimes provides an
endless list of activities that can- be encompassed within the term
"computer crime." For example, computer crimes can include crimes
involving pomography,2  auction fraud,2 telecommunication fraud, 4
copyright and piracy offenses,25' online extortion plots,2 6 identity fraud,27
17 Article 7 is "Computer-related Forgery" and Article 8 is "Computer-related Fraud."
Draft Convention, supra note 12, at ch. II, § 1, arts. 7-8.
"S Ellen S. Podgor, Computer Crime, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & JUSTICE 221-28
(Joshua Dressler, ed., 2nd ed. forthcoming 2002); see also Scott Charney & Kent Alexander,
Computer Crime, 45 EMORY L.J. 931, 934 (1996) (discussing how computer can be "target of
the offense," "tool of the offense," or "incidental to the offense"); Joe D. Whitley & William
H. Jordan, Computer Crime, E-1 ABA WHITE COLLAR CRIME INST. § 21.0111], at 21-3 to 21-6
(1999) (describing how computer can be "object, subject, or instrument of a crime").
" Computers are often used as "communications tools" to commit online a traditional,
"off-line" crime such as fraud or pornography. See ELECTRONIC FRONTIER, supra note 6, at
9-11.
Id. at 7-9 ("This form of crime targets a computer system, generally to acquire
information stored on that computer system, to control the target system without
authorization or payment (theft of service), or to alter the integrity of data or interfere with
the availability of the computer or server."). Id.
"' Often the computer is merely the storage device used to keep information for
criminal acts. See id. at 9.
' See George Ivezaj, Child Pornography on the Internet: An Examination of the International
Communities 'Proposed Solutions'for a Global Problem, 8 MSU-DCL J. INT'L L. 819 (1999)
(discussing international initiatives that can be used for deterring child pornography); see
also N.C. Man Convicted in Internet Sex Case, ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 2, 2001, at 6B.
(discussing individual's alleged entry into chat room to carry on sexually explicit
conversations with 13-year-old).
See Three in Texas Indicted for Mail Fraud in Connection with Internet Auctions, 1
Cybercrime L. Rep. (P & F) No. 6A at 7 (June 18, 2001) (discussing defendants' use of
Internet to sell items they did not possess); Karen Dean, It's a Crime, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Mar. 5, 2000, at 1H (noting how auction fraud is primary type of Internet fraud).
" See SECT. OF SCIENCE & TECH., ABA, GUIDE TO THE PROSECUTION OF
TELECOMMUNICATION FRAUD BY THE USE OF COMPUTER CRIME STATUTES (1989).
See Christopher P. Bussert, Software Piracy, Napster and MP3s - Is Intellectual Property
Safe?, C-i 1ST ANNUAL CYBERCRIME INST., PROGRAM MATERIALS, INST. OF CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUC. IN GA. (2000).
See John Markoff, Thief Reveals Credit Card Data When Web Extortion Plot Fails, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 10, 2000, at Al (discussing alleged online extortion plot).
.27 See Tycoons Targeted in Alleged Identity Fraud Scheme, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Mar. 21,
2001, at 3E.
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hacking,2 cyberterrorism, and cyberstalking. Many of these crimes
are traditional offenses that are now being committed through the use of
a computer.3'
The perpetrators, victims, and motives can also vary greatly in
computer crimes. For example, one offender may be a juvenile hacker
intent upon showing off his or her abilities to break into a government
security system. Then again, the offender may be a terrorist breaking
into the same system for the purpose of destroying the government
entity."
The vast array of activities that can be associated with computer
crimes makes it simple to argue that one should focus on the act of the
perpetrator and merely consider the computer the medium used.33 The
U.S. Department of Justice appears to endorse this approach.m In
contrast, other commentators provide strong arguments that computers
2 California Man Gets 18 Months for Unauthorized Access and Causing Damage to Hundreds
of Computer Systems, 1 Cybercrime L. Rep. (P & F) No. 6A, at 8 (June 18, 2001) (discussing
how computer intrusions compromised many computer systems); see also Mary M. Calkins,
Note, They Shoot Trojan Horses, Don't They? An Economic Analysis of Anti-Hacking Regulatory
Models, 89 GEo. L.J. 171 (2000); Matt Richtel, Federal Cybercrime Unit Hunts for Hackers, N.Y.
TIMES, June 2, 1999, at A16.
'2 See Cybercrimes: Infrastructure Threats From Cyber-Terrorists, 4 CYBERSPACE LAW, 23
(Apr. 1999).
m See 1999 REPORT ON CYBERSTALKING: A NEW CHALLENGE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND INDUSTRY, A REPORT FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO THE VICE PRESIDENT (Aug.
1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/cyberstalking.htm.
" See, e.g., United States v. Champion, 248 F.3d 502 (6th Cir. 2001) (using Internet to
coerce and entice minor to engage in sexual act). In some cases the crime may be
dependant upon whether the conduct meets traditional elements of an offense, such as
theft. Eli Lederman, Criminal Liability for Breach of Confidential Commercial Information, 38
EMORY L.J. 921, 934-36, 940 (1989). Laws governing trade secrets and confidential computer
information may focus on the exclusiveness of the protected item. See generally id.
(explaining how these laws overlap to form "shared domain" beyond their "exclusive
realms").
'2 The "hacker" who engages in the computer activity with a criminal intent to cause
damage is often described as a "cracker." See Eric J. Sinrod & William P. Reilly, Cyber-
crimes: A Practical Approach to the Application of Federal Computer Crime Laws, 16 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 177, 181-83 (2000).
' See, e.g., Bruce P. Keller, The Game's the Same: Why Gambling in Cyberspace Violates
Federal Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1569, 1575 (1999) ( "[Tihere is nothing unique about Internet
gambling that should lead the federal government to abandon its traditional protective role
in this area....").
' "The Department of Justice ('DOJ') broadly defines computer crimes as 'any
violations of criminal law that involve a knowledge of computer technology for their
perpetration, investigation, or prosecution."' Laura J. Nicholson et al., Computer Crimes, 37
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 207, 208-09 (2000) (citing NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
COMPUTER CRIME: CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESOURCE MANUAL 2 (1989)).
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need to be treated differently.35 For example, Professor Neal Kumar
Katyal presents the economic rationales for finding that "cyberspace is a
unique medium" that demands a distinct set of rules&6
The federal statutory approach in the United States to computer crime
offers little in resolving the differing approaches to this subject. On one
hand, there exists a computer fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1030, that
examines seven different types of computer related conduct.37 Based on
See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders - The Rise of Law in Cyberspace,
48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1367 (1996) ("Global computer-based communications cut across
territorial borders, creating a new realm of human activity and undermining the feasibility
- and legitimacy - of laws based on geographic boundaries."); Neal Kumar Katyal,
Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1004 (2001).
' Id. Johnson & Post, supra note 35, at 1367.
' 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a), as amended by the USA Patriot Act of 2001, provides:
(a) Whoever -
(1) having knowingly accessed a computer without authorization or
exceeding authorized access, and by means of such conduct having
obtained information that has been determined by the United States
Government pursuant to an Executive order or statute to require protection
against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national defense or foreign
relations, or any restricted data, as defined in paragraph y or section 11 of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, with reason to believe that such information
so obtained could be used to the injury of the United States, or to the
advantage of any foreign nation willfully communicates, delivers,
transmits, or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted the same
to any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails
to deliver it to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive
it;
(2) intentionally access a computer without authorization or exceeds
authorized access, and thereby obtains -
(A) information contained in a financial record of a financial
institution, or of a card issuer as defined in section 1602(n) of title 15,
or contained in a file of a consumer reporting agency on a consumer,
as such terms are defined in the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. §
1681 et seq.);
(B) information from any department or agency of the United States;
or
(C) information from any protected computer if the conduct involved
an interstate or foreign communication
(3) intentionally, without authorization to access any nonpublic computer of
a department or agency of the United States, accesses such a computer of
that department or agency that is exclusively for the use of the Government
of the United States or, in the case of a computer not exclusively for such
use, is used by or for the Government of the United States and such conduct
affects that use by or for the Government of the United States;
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(4) knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer
without authorization, or exceeds authorized access, and by means of such
conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of value, unless
the object of the fraud and the thing obtained consists only of the use of the
computer and the value of such use is not more than $5,000 in any 1-year
period;
(5)(A)(i) knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information,
code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes
damage without authorization, to a protected computer;
(ii) intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization,
and as a result of such conduct, recklessly causes damage; or
(iii) intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization
and as a result of such conduct, causes damage; and
(B) by conduct described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) of subparagraph (A),
caused (or, in the case of an attempted offense, would, if completed,
have caused) -
(i) loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year period (and, for
purposes of an investigation, prosecution, or other proceeding
brought by the United States only, loss resulting from a related
course of conduct affecting 1 or more other protected computers)
aggregating at least $5,000 in value;
(ii) the modification or impairment, or potential modification or
impairment, of the medical examination, diagnosis, treatment, or
care of 1 or more individuals;
(iii) physical injury to any person;
(iv) a threat to public health or safety; or
(v) damage affecting a computer system used by or for a
government entity in furtherance of the administration of justice,
national defense, or national security;
(6) knowingly and with intent to defraud traffics (as defined in section 1029)
in any password or similar information through which a computer may be
accessed without authorization, if-
(A) such trafficking affects interstate or foreign commerce; or
(B) such computer is used by or for the Government of the United
States;
(7) with intent to extort from any person, any money or other thing of
value, transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication
containing any threat to cause damage to a protected computer; shall be
punished as provided in subsection (c) of this section.
Id. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), amended by USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L.
No. 107-56, tit. V, sec. 814(a)-(b), § 1030(a)(5), (7), 115 Stat. 272; see H.R. 3162, 107th Cong. §
814 (2001).
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this statute, one might conclude that Congress recognizes a need to treat
computer crimes separately. The statute includes different types of
computer-specific conduct, such as acts involving the use of a computer
for espionage, browsing in a government computer,39 interstate
trafficking of passwords,' ° and extortion activity resulting from the use
of a computer."
When, however, one examines the sentencing guidelines used to
formulate the prison sentences of those convicted under § 1030, one sees
that the use of the computer reflects merely the means for committing a
traditional form of crime. At present, the sentencing guidelines
applicable to 18 U.S.C. § 1030 do not contain guidelines exclusive to
computer fraud offenses. In some cases, the court might use a fraud
guideline,4 while other cases might warrant a theft43 or espionage
guideline." Sentencing guidelines for technology offenses, however,
have been a subject of recent examination by the United States
Sentencing Commission. It remains to be seen whether this examination
will result in changes to the existing sentencing structure used for
45
computer crimes.
Besides the computer fraud statute, prosecutors also use generic
statutes to prosecute computer crimes." One finds computer-related
prosecutions using statutes such as wire fraud, copyright
infringement," illegal transportation of stolen property,9  and
§ 1030(a)(1).
§ 1030(a)(3).
, § 1030(a)(3).
, § 1030(a)(7).
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2F1.1 (2000).
'3 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 (2000).
" See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2M3.2 (2000).
41 See U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Symposium, Federal Sentencing Policy for Economic
Crimes and New Technology Offenses (2000) [hereinafter Federal Sentencing Symposium],
available at http://www.ussc.gov/2000sympo/2000sympo.htm.
Glen D. Baker, Trespassers will be Prosecuted: Computer Crimes in the 1990s, 12
COMPUTER L.J. 61, 79-91 (1993) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 1030 and other statutes that have
been used to prosecute alleged computer crimes):
" 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1994). See, e.g., United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535 (D.
Mass. 1994) (dismissing alleged computer prosecution that was brought under wire fraud
statute); see also Michael P. Dierks, Computer Network Abuse, 6 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 307, 325-
27 (1993) (discussing how wire fraud statute has been used to prosecute computer crimes);
Aaron D. Hoag, Note, Defrauding the Wire Fraud Statute: United States v. LaMacchia, 8
HARV. J.L. TECH. 509 (1995) (discussing how MIT student was indicted under federal wire
fraud statute for operating website that allowed users to download copyrighted software
free of charge).
17 U.S.C. § 506 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
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conspiracy. °  In this regard, one might conclude that the federal
approach is premised upon the computer being used as the medium for
51the commission of a crime.
B. Fraud
Equally perplexing is the definition of fraud. Fraud is a "concept"
52
bereft with breadth. It can be conduct that is subject to punishment, the
mens rea in a statute, or it can also be used in conjunction with other
terms to describe conduct or activity, such as "obtains by fraud" or a
"scheme or artifice to defraud." Moreover, fraud is a term that crosses
into both the civil and criminal arenas.
Although the concept of fraud was initially limited to acts against the
public, today the term encompasses a wide array of conduct, including
conduct exclusively between two private individuals. The term fraud is
interpreted differently if examined from the perspective of the Model
Penal Code,53 statistical reporting of crimes,54 and the sentencing
guidelines.55 Although numerous substantive offenses in Title 18 use
terms related to "fraud," a more limited application will be used in this
Article.
For purposes of this Article, fraud will not include crimes related to
espionage or terrorist activity. Despite the fact that 18 U.S.C. § 1030, the
federal computer fraud statute, includes these types of activities, this
Article is limited to the classic understanding of what constitutes fraud.
The reason for limiting fraud will become apparent when discussing
aspects of extraterritoriality.
- 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
- 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
51 Legislation is also pending to enlarge the existing mail fraud statute to add a
misdemeanor criminalizing the "intentional sending of span with a false or misleading
return address." Lawmakers Introduce Bill in Senate Criminalizing Sending of Unwanted Spain, 1
Cybercrirne L. Rep. (P & F) No. 1, at 7 (Apr. 9, 2001).
5 Ellen S. Podgor, Criminal Fraud, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 729, 730 n.3 (1999).
Id. at 746-47.
Id. at 742-43.
Id. at 743-46.
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C. Criminal Computer Fraud
For purposes of this Article, computer fraud is defined similar to the
definition accorded it by the Council of Europe Cyber-Crime
Convention. This definition focuses on intentionally causing a loss of
property in order to improperly secure economic benefits and
advantages by "any input, alteration, deletion or suppression of
computer data" or "any interference with the functioning of a computer
or system."56 Included within the definition is fraud related to Internet
57 5
auctions, telemarketing fraud,58 intentional illegal entry into sites for
economic gain, and misuse of a computer for the purpose of achieving
an illegal economic advantage.5 9  Excluded will be espionage that is
geared toward securing a political advantage. Computer fraud can have
government victims, such as when the illegal computer act involves
bidding for government contracts. Computer fraud can, likewise, have
victims that are private individuals and businesses.
Although computer fraud actions can be subject to both civil and
criminal action, this Article is limited to the criminal sphere. With
respect to civil actions, the American Bar Association (ABA) Report on
According to Article 8- Computer-related Fraud:
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as criminal offenses
under its domestic law, when committed intentionally and without right, the
causing of a loss of property to another by:
a. any input, alteration, deletion or suppression of computer data,
b. any inference with the functioning of a computer system, with
fraudulent or dishonest intent of procuring, without right, an economic
benefit for oneself or for another.
Draft Convention, supra note 12, at Ch. H, § 1, Tit. 2, Art. 8- Computer-related fraud.
In 1988, auction fraud constituted the highest number of Internet fraud complaints.
Karen Dean, It's a Crime, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Mar. 5, 2000, at 1H (listing top ten sources
of Internet fraud complaints in 1998, as provided by National Fraud Information Center:
(1) Auctions, (2) General merchandise, (3) Computer hardware/software, (4) Internet-
related services, (5) Work-at-home opportunities, (6) Business opportunities/franchises, (7)
Multilevel marketing, (8) Credit card issuing, (9) Advance-fee loans, (10) Job
offers/overseas work).
" See U.S.-CAN. WORKING GROUP, supra note 12, at Executive Summary ("Telemarketing
fraud has become one of the most pervasive forms of white-collar crime in the United
States and Canada, with annual losses in both countries in the billions of dollars.").
The types of fraud that are increasing in number include: "auction or retail fraud,"
securities fraud, "pyramid or Ponzi schemes," credit card fraud, identity theft, "business
opportunity schemes." See Jonathan Rusch, Remarks at Breakout Session Four, Day Two,
Consumer Fraud Via the Internet, Symposium on Federal Sentencing Policy for Economic
Crimes and New Technology Offenses 290-94 (Oct. 13, 2000), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/2000sympo/vGroupFourDayTwo.pdtf.
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Jurisdiction in Cyberspace Project, titled Achieving Legal and Business
Order in Cyberspace, presents a thorough catalogue for answering
jurisdiction questions that arise in the electronic commerce area.6 The
continuing project of the American Bar Association covers a multitude of
jurisdiction issues that can arise in areas such as tax, intellectual
61property, and securities law. Internet commerce, however, is not
equivalent to "Internet crime."62 The ABA Report does not speak to
these criminal law issues; questions that present unique qualities in part
because of the possible punishment of imprisonment, procedural issues
such as extradition, and constitutional rights that are provided to
defendants in criminal cases. Likewise, criminal law cases do not use
the traditional principles that assist in resolving jurisdiction questions
that arise in civil matters. 4
The true extent of computer fraud is hard to determine, in that some
businesses may be reluctant to report the crime for fear of possible
repercussions to their companies. 65 Nonetheless, it is apparent that the
number of Internet related fraud offenses is not a nominal figure, and the
A.B.A. JURISDICTION IN CYBERSPACE PROJECT, Achieving Legal and Business Order in
Cyberspace: A Report on Global Jurisdiction Issues Created by the Internet, TRANSNATIONAL
ISSUES IN CYBERSPACE: A PROJECT ON THE LAW RELATING TO JURISDICTION, LONDON
MEEING DRAFT REPORT, available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/cyber/initiatives
/draft.rtf.
" See id. (outlining ongoing issues related to Jurisdiction in Cyberspace Project).
62 Id. at 9.
Defendants in criminal cases have no right to choose their jurisdiction through a
contract with the prosecutor. Although plea bargains may encompass an agreement on
jurisdiction, the agreement comes after the activity occurs, as opposed to an agreement
reached between parties prior to a particular incident, as can be secured in some civil
matters. Additionally, the ABA Report predominantly speaks to enforcement of
judgments, but does not speak of imprisonment. Id. at 90-93. The section on Data
Protection, however, does refer to criminal enforcement. Id. at 111.
" See, e.g., Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714 (1877); see also Symposium, Jurisdiction and the Internet, 32 INT'L LAW. 959 (1998)
(discussing various issues concerning jurisdiction in cyberspace).
0 BRANSTEN, supra note 12. More private-sector companies are reporting to and
cooperating with the government when computer security breaches occur in their
businesses. See Cybercrime: Special Field Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Technology, Terrorism,
and Government Information of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (Apr. 21,
2000) (statement of Guadalupe Gonzalez, Special Agent in Charge, Phoenix Field Division,
Federal Bureau of Investigation) (discussing improvement in reporting by private
businesses) [hereinafter Gonzalez Statement], available at http://www.fbi.gov/congress
/congress00/gonza42100.htm; see also Government, Private Industry Combine to Fight
Internet Fraud, CLA Conference Told, 1 Cybercrime L. Rep. (F & P) No. 4, at 3 (May 21, 2001)
(reporting steps taken by DOJ, Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and eBay Inc. to identify
and combat online fraud).
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number appears to be increasing." Recently, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation targeted fraudulent schemes involving computers
including, "online auction fraud, credit card fraud, bank fraud,
investment fraud, multilevel marketing, and pyramid schemes."
67
II. EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
International crime" has become a growing concern in the United
States. 9  Fraud is a part of the increasing amount of crime that is-
occurring on the international level.70  When fraud operates
internationally without computers, it is fairly easy to determine a locus
for the offense. Typically, the location of the perpetrators' scheme to
defraud, the location of the mailing, or the location of the telephone call
becomes the venue for the prosecution. Of course, this approach does
"[A representative of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)] reported that in 1997
'the Commission received fewer than 1,000 Internet fraud complaints'.... in 2000, the FTC
received 25,000 complaints related to online fraud." New Anti-Fraud Laws Called
Unnecessary, 1 Cybercrime L. Rep. (P & F) No. 6, at 3 (June 4, 2001). This increase is
mirrored in other countries. For example, Russia Interior Ministry reported that "the
number of Internet -related crimes in Russia jumped to 200 for the first three months of this
year 'more than all of those recorded for 1999.'" BRANSTEN, supra note 12; see also Press
Release, Computer Security Institute, Financial Losses Due to Internet Intrusions, Trade
Secret Theft and Other Cyber Crimes Soar (May 12, 2001) (reporting on Computer Security
Institute's announcement of results of its 2001 Computer Crime and Security Survey, which
"confirm that the threat from computer crime and other information security breaches
continues unabated and that the financial toll is mounting"). Identity fraud has also
significantly increased. "[Tihe Federal Trade Commission currently records about 1,700
complaints and inquiries per week on identity fraud compared with 400 in March of 2000."
Treasury Department's Suspicious Activity Review Indicates Dramatic Increase in Identity Theft, 1
Cybercrime L. Rep. (P & F) No. 7, at 3 (July 2,2001).
67 FBI Cracks Down on Internet Fraud, National Investigation Nets Series of Charges, 1
Cybercrime L. Rep. (P & F) No. 6, at 3 (June 4, 2001).
' "International crime" is used here in a generic sense to mean individual criminal
responsibility, despite the fact that some consider that the term is limited to crimes for a
state's breach of an international obligation. See Edward M. Wise, International Crimes and
Domestic Criminal Law, 38 DEPAuL L. REv. 923,928-29 (1989).
International crimes involving computers have also been increasing. See Chinese
Hackers Invade 2 Official U.S. Web Sites, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2001, at 6; Adobe, DMCA Foes
Say Free Accused Russian eBook Hacker; U.S. Declines, 1 Cybercrime L. Rep. (P & F) No. 9, at 3
(July 30, 2001) (discussing arrest of Russian programmer for acts occurring outside of
United States); Markoff, supra note 26, at Al (reporting that.computer intruder believed to
be from Eastern Europe); Hackers From Abroad Obtain Data on Washington Patients, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 6, 2000, at A21 (reporting how Dutch man stole confidential medical records
from University of Washington's medical center Web site).
' Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, International Crime
Control Strategy (May 12, 1998), available at http://www.usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol
/terror/ crimestr.htm.
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not presume that the prosecution is limited to one specific jurisdiction.
Several jurisdictions may be entitled to prosecute when the perpetrator
acts in more than one place, or when the conduct involves a conspiracy
with the agreement or overt acts in several different locations.
In contrast, the venue for prosecuting computer fraud may not focus
exclusively on the physical location of the perpetrator. The Internet may
offer a multitude of different jurisdictions as a venue for a criminal
prosecution. With the Internet, there is the initial site where the activity
commences. The Internet message may then pass through an array of
different sites. It may proceed into a multitude of different locations,
some of which may not depend upon what the initial perpetrator
intended. Multiple individuals may access a page on the World Wide
Web that may bring them into the realm of the criminal activity.71
Moreover, unlike the classic criminal conduct engaged in by an
individual, the victims of the fraud may be totally unknown individuals
to the actual perpetrator.
Under what circumstances does the United States have jurisdiction to
prosecute a perpetrator of computer crime? When the perpetrator acts
within the United States and commits the initial criminal computer
conduct in the United States, and the victims are likewise in the same
country, there is no question that there is jurisdiction to prosecute in the
United States. When the perpetrator acts within the United States,
although the victims may be outside the borders, jurisdiction is also
readily apparent as being in the United States. Jurisdiction, however,
becomes problematic when the activity by the perpetrator occurs outside
this country but substantially affects individuals within this country.
Presently, two considerations determine whether there is
extraterritorial jurisdiction that permits the prosecution to occur in the
United States. Courts look at the pertinent criminal statute to determine
legislative intent in providing for extraterritorial application. Courts also
examine the international bases of jurisdiction; here, the court focuses on
whether extraterritoriality is justified under principles of territoriality,
nationality, passive personality, universality, or the protective
principle.72 Note, however, that courts vary on the ordering of these two
71 When the perpetrator initially acts within the United States, jurisdiction is not
controversial, even if the criminal activities exceed the borders of the United States. See
David Kocieniewski, Man is Charged in the Creation of E-Mail Virus, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1999,
at Al (discussing prosecution of New Jersey individual for creation of "Melissa Virus").
7 These five principles originate from a Harvard study. See RESEARCH IN INT'L LAW,
FACULTY OF HARVARD LAW SCH., introductory comment to Part II: Jurisdiction With Respect to
Crime, in CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435, 445 (Supp. 1935).
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considerations, with some courts looking first at the statute and
congressional intent and other courts initially examining whether the
conduct falls within the international bases of jurisdiction.
When one examines the extraterritorial application of computer fraud
crimes using this traditional approach, it is easy to secure jurisdiction in
the United States. Approaching computer crimes in a technologically
neutral way 74 means that any substantial effect upon the United States
may provide a sufficient basis under international law for the United
States to obtain jurisdiction for a prosecution. Drawing jurisdiction lines
premised upon the specific conduct involved, however, can prove
problematic and give rise to many questions. For example, should the
United States limit extraterritorial computer prosecutions to acts
involving cyberterrorism? Should juvenile hacking, auction fraud, and
economic espionage be the subject of United States prosecution, even
when the initial act occurs outside the borders of this country? Should it
make a difference if the prosecution proceeds under the computer-fraud
statute or the federal wire-fraud statute? Should it make a difference
whether the computer is used as a storage device or as the object or target
of the crime? Should it make a difference if the individual specifically
targets individuals in the United States?75 Despite the fact that many
questions remain unanswered, the United States has proceeded with
extraterritorial application in prosecuting computer related crimes. For
example, individuals outside the United States have been indicted for
76 78
crimes such as child pornography, gambling,7 copyright crimes, and
Some scholars add additional bases in discussing prescriptive jurisdiction. See ALDRICH,
supra note 14, at 31, 41-42. (adding consensual jurisdiction "based on consent of the
accused's state").
' See e.g., United States v. Velasquez-Mercaso, 697 F. Supp. 292, 294 (S.D. Tex. 1988)
(looking first at congressional intent); but see United States v. Felix-Gutierrez, 940 F.2d 1200,
1203-06 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Prior to giving extraterritorial effect to any penal statute, we must
consider whether extraterritorial application would violate international law.").
" See ELECTRONIC FRONTIER, supra note 6, at 4 (outlining three-part approach for
addressing unlawful conduct on Internet, which includes "evaluating the need for Internet-
specific regulation of unlawful conduct through a framework of general policy principles,
including the principle that online and offline, conduct should be treated consistently and
in a technology-neutral way").
In Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Lique Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, a U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California considered a reverse scenario, that is, "whether the First
Amendment protects speech originating within the United States that is expressly targeted
at a foreign market." Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Lique Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 2001
WL 1381157, at *10 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
76 See First-ever Life Sentence Given for Child Pornography; Multimillion Dollar Enterprise
Dismantled, 1 Cybercrime L. Rep. (P & F) No. 10, at 3 (Aug. 13, 2001) (discussing indictment
of two Indonesians and one Russian).
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fraud related offenses. 9
Presently, the United States does not have a federal criminal statute
that speaks to issues of extraterritoriality for criminal acts.
Reconfiguring extraterritorial jurisdiction can be accomplished internally
within the United States by adopting general or specific jurisdiction
statutes applicable to criminal offenses. A proposed federal criminal
code, discussed below, considered a general provision pertaining to
extraterritorial jurisdiction. This proposal, however, did not become a
part of United States federal law.
A. Statutory Recognition of Extraterritoriality
In some instances, Congress provides clear statutory language
indicating that the criminal conduct at issue may be prosecuted,
irrespective of whether it occurred inside or outside this country. A clear
congressional indication of extraterritorial application provides an easy
resolution to questions of extraterritorial jurisdiction. For example, some
criminal statutes are focused specifically on extraterritorial conduct, such
as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Other statutes include explicit
provisions of extraterritoriality, such as found in one of the key money
laundering statutes.8 1  These statutes provide a clear indication that
Congress intended for the statutes to operate extraterritorially. In some
instances, Congress will place restrictions on when the statute can have
an extraterritorial application. For example, prosecutors have not been
successful in charging foreign officials with conspiracy to commit a
violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 2 Likewise, the money
' See Second Circuit Upholds Conviction of Founder of Offshore Internet Gambling
Operation, 1 Cybercrime L. Rep. (P & F) No. 10, at 7 (Aug. 13, 2001) (discussing affirmation
of conviction for offshore Internet gambling site in Antigua).
See Russian Programmer Accused of Writing Software to Unlock E-Books Released on Bond,
1 Cybercrime L. Rep. (P & F) No. 10, at 8 (Aug. 13, 2001) (discussing arrest under Digital
Millennium Copyright Act of Russian programmer while attending conference in United
States).
Bogus FBI Company Snares Russian Hackers; Indictments Follow in Connecticut,
Washington, and California, 1 Cybercrime L. Rep. (P & F) No. 7, at 7 (July 2, 2001) (discussing
federal indictment of Russians on "charges for breaking into computer systems, stealing
credit card information, and attempting to extort payments from victim companies in
exchange for computer security services").
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act criminalizes the bribery of foreign government
officials by United States individuals and companies. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff
(1994 & Supp. V 1999).
" See 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1994 & Supp. V 1999); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (1994)
(permitting extraterritorial prosecution in certain circumstances).
s' See United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that Congress
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laundering statute has restrictions on when the extraterritorial
provisions apply.3
Where language of extraterritoriality is absent from the statute, it
becomes necessary for courts to look at congressional intent.
84
Specifically, courts attempt to discern whether Congress intended for the
statute to have an extraterritorial application. Often, this inquiry can be
a difficult task for courts.8
18 U.S.C. § 1030, the computer fraud statute, does not include an
explicit extraterritorial provision that is exclusively focused on acts of
fraud.& In recent amendments to § 1030, added as part of the "Uniting
and Strengthening America by providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001" ("U.S.A. Patriot Act"),
Congress added the language "including a computer located outside the
United States that is used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign
commerce or communication of the United States."8 7 This new provision
is included as part of section 814 of the Act, a section regarding
"deterrence and prevention of cyberterrorism." Although the focus of
intended to limit the application of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to a "well defined
group of persons"); see also H. Lowell Brown, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the 1988
Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Does the Government's Reach Now Exceed its
Grasp?, 26 N.C. J. Int'l L. Com. Reg. 239, 292 (2001) (discussing how Congress did not
amend the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to permit prosecution of "foreign nationals" who
were not "issuers" under the Act).
Section 1956(f) reads:
(0 There is extraterritorial jurisdiction over the conduct prohibited by this section
if-
(1) the conduct is by a United States citizen or, in the case of a non-United
States citizen, the conduct occurs in part in the United States; and
(2) the transaction or series of related transactions involves funds or
monetary instruments of a value exceeding $10,000.
18 U.S.C. § 1956(f) (1994).
" See Ellen S. Podgor, Globalization and the Federal Prosecution of White Collar Crime, 34
AM. CRiM. L. REV. 325, 336-40 (1997) (interpreting congressional intent to incorporate
extraterritoriality into white-collar crime statutes).
I Lea Brilmayer aptly states, "[p]resumptions of legislative intent are something of a
Frankenstein monster: Easy to create, but hard to control." Lea Brilmayer, The
Extraterritorial Application of American Law: A Methodological and Constitutional Appraisal, 50
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1987, at 11, 16.
8 The British Misuse Act presents a contrasting approach by including specific
provisions pertaining to jurisdiction. See Steve Shackelford, Note, Computer-Related Crime:
An International Problem in Need of an International Solution, 27 TEx. INT'L L.J. 479, 501-04
(1992).
H.R. 3162, 107th Cong. § 814(d)(1) (2001).
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the U.S.A. Patriot Act was on acts of cyberterrorism, the new provision is
added into a definition section of a "protected computer," a provision
that can apply equally to acts of both terrorism and fraud.m The extent to
which courts will assume that Congress has explicitly spoken with
respect to computer acts involving fraud that affects the United States,
remains to be seen.
When the prosecution proceeds under § 1030, it is restricted to the
seven specific activities that are expressed in the statute.s9 A wider range
of fraudulent conduct can be the subject of a criminal prosecution if
prosecutors use 18 U.S.C. § 1343, the federal wire fraud statute.90 Section
1343 does not offer a definitive resolution of whether extraterritorial
application will be permitted.91 Therefore, it becomes necessary for the
judiciary to ascertain whether Congress intended for prosecutors to use
the statute for conduct occurring outside the United States. Other
statutes also criminalize acts committed with a computer, and these
statutes can also require judicial inquiry into whether extraterritorial
application should be permitted.92
The classic judicial approach to extraterritorial criminal application is
found in the Supreme Court case of United States v. Bowman, where the
Court stressed the importance of determining congressional intent in the
absence of express statutory language. In Bowman, the Court held that
there is a presumption against extraterritorial application when the
crime was "against private individuals or their property."94 If, however,
18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(4) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
See ELLEN S. PODGOR & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, WHITE COLLAR CRIME IN A NUTSHELL, 237-
41 (2d ed. 1997).
o The breadth of the wire fraud statute permits the prosecution of any "scheme or
artifice to defraud" that involves an interstate or foreign transmission "by means of wire,
radio, or television communication." 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). See also
PODGOR & ISRAEL, supra at note 89, at 71-72.
91 See United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580, 587-88 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that U.S. wire
fraud could not be used to prosecute scheme to defraud foreign government of tax
revenue); but see United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547, 552 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that U.S.
wire fraud statute could be used in prosecuting scheme to defraud foreign government of
tax revenue).
See Baker, supra note 46, at 79-91. See also Marc S. Friedman & Camille Otero-
Phillips, Internet Crime and Abuse: Latest Developments, 6 E-CoM. L. REP. 2 (1999) (discussing
different federal statutes that can be used to prosecute computer-related crimes).
260 U.S. 94 (1922).
' The Court in Bowman explained:
Crimes against private individuals or their property, like assaults, murder,
burglary, larceny, robbery, arson, embezzlement, and frauds of all kinds, which
affect the peace and good order of the community, must, of course, be committed
within the territorial jurisdiction of the government where it may properly
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the crime was "not logically dependent on the[] locality for the
government's jurisdiction," then an extraterritorial application might be
permitted.9" Today, courts have moved further from the restrictions and
presumptions set forth in Bowman." Generally, courts permit
extraterritorial jurisdiction in criminal cases if the criminal conduct
affected or was intended to affect individuals in the United States.
B. International Bases
Where some courts stress the importance of statutory interpretation,
other courts focus on international law and whether extraterritoriality
should be permitted under the consensual rules of international law.
International law focuses on three forms of jurisdiction: jurisdiction to
prescribe, adjudicate, and enforce.97 In the United States, the ability to
exercise it. If punishment of them is to be extended to include those committed
outside [sic] of the strict territorial jurisdiction, it is natural for Congress to say so
in the statute, and failure to do so will negate the purpose of Congress in this
regard.
Id. at 98.
The Bowman Court again explained:
But the same interpretation should not be applied to criminal statutes which are,
as a class, not logically dependent on their locality for the government's
jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the right of the government to defend
itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated, especially if committed
by its own citizens, officers, or agents. Some such offenses can only be
committed within the territorial jurisdiction diction of the government because of
the local acts required to constitute them. Others are such that to limit their locus
to the strictly territorial jurisdiction would be greatly to curtail the scope and
usefulness of the statute and leave open a large immunity for frauds as easily
committed by citizens on the high seas and in foreign countries as at home.
Id.
See, e.g., United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that United
States District Court had jurisdiction to indict and convict non-U.S. citizen for false
statements made on visa application submitted to consular official working outside United
States).
1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 401 (1987):
§ 401 Categories of Jurisdiction:
Under international law, a state is subject to limitations on: (a) jurisdiction to
prescribe, i.e., to make its law applicable to the activities, relations, or status of
persons, or the interests of persons in things, whether by legislation, by executive
act or order, by administrative rule or regulation or by determination of a court;
(b) jurisdiction to adjudicate, i.e., to subject persons or things to the process of its
courts or administrative tribunals, whether in civil or in criminal proceedings,
whether or not the state is a party to the proceedings; (c) jurisdiction to enforce,
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adjudicate and enforce is dependent upon first acquiring jurisdiction to
prescribe via legislative, executive, judicial, or administrative rule,
ruling, or regulation. While jurisdiction to prescribe is normally
reflected by examining the relation of the crime, victims, or perpetrator
to the country seeking jurisdiction, cyberspace presents new
considerations for making the determination of the appropriate place of
jurisdiction.98 These new considerations result in part because the ease of
securing an international base of jurisdiction is multiplied in the world of
cyberspace.
1. Jurisdictional Bases
The five most common bases for finding international jurisdiction to
prescribe are premised upon principles of territoriality, nationality,
passive personality, protective principle, or universality.9 In some cases
more than one jurisdictional base is used by a court to approve the
prosecution of extraterritorial conduct.1°° These jurisdictional bases are
i.e., to induce or compel compliance or to punish noncompliance with its laws or
regulations, whether through the courts or by use of executive, administrative,
police, or other nonjudicial action.
Denis T. Rice, Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Which Law and Forum Applies to Securities
Transactions on the Internet?, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L. 585, 595-96 (2000) ("[J]urisdictional
principles are difficult to apply to the Internet, which is a largely boundless medium.")
91 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (1987):
§ 402 Bases of Jurisdiction to Prescribe:
Subject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to:
(1) (a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its territory;
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its territory;
(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial
effect within its territory;
(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as
within its territory; and
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is
directed against the security of the state or against a limited class of other state
interests.
See, e.g., Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1311-13 (9th Cir. 1984)
(applying both objective territorial and protective principles to establish jurisdiction);
United States v. Roberts, 1 F. Supp.2d 601, 607 (E.D. La. 1998) (applying both objective
territorial and passive personality principles to establish jurisdiction).
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not unique to criminal law, applying equally, to cyberspace jurisdiction
questions that arise in the civil sphere.
The most common base of jurisdiction used by U.S. courts is territorial
jurisdiction, jurisdiction premised upon the locus of the crime.
Obviously, the United States has territorial jurisdiction over a
perpetrator when the criminal act occurs in this country. Territorial
jurisdiction does not raise controversial issues with respect to
jurisdiction, except to the extent that this type of jurisdiction is too
limited. Attorney Gary Born, in demonstrating the obsolete nature of
using a territorial principle, argues for a new approach, one in which
"courts could presume that Congress has extended federal law to the
limits prescribed by the principles of international law currently
prevailing in the United States."102
Over time, territorial jurisdiction has expanded to include not only
acts within the locus, but also acts that are an extension of the locus'
This approach, called the objective territorial principle, has been
endorsed wholeheartedly in the United States. Where the strict
territorial approach referred to acts committed within the jurisdiction,
the objective territorial approach included acts that affected those within
the jurisdiction, although committed extraterritorially.
In Strassheim v. Daily,1°s the Supreme Court described the objective
territorial principle as "[a]cts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to
produce and producing detrimental effects within it." 16 The objective
territorial principle is a common base of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the
101 Wilske & Schiller, supra note 10, at 117 (discussing jurisdictional issues involved in
state regulation of cyberspace).
"0 Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 LAw & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 1, 82 (1992).
103 See id. at 21-29 (discussing erosion of territorial presumption).
104 Historical literature also supports a territorial approach that includes acts both
within the territory and that affect the territory. In 1906, Professor John Bassett Moore
wrote that, "The principle that a man who outside of a country willfully puts in motion a
force to take effect in it is answerable at the place where the evil is done, is recognized in
the criminal jurisprudence of all countries." JOHN BASSETT MOORE, 2 A DIcEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw 244 (1906); see also Born, supra note 102, at 22. The extension of the
territorial principle to include effects on the territory is not exclusive to the United States.
See The Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., (ser. A), No. 10 (extending
territorial jurisdiction to include its effects).
10 221 U.S. 280 (1911).
" Id. at 285. Subjective territoriality differs in that it "aims to assign jurisdiction to the
courts of a state with respect to offenses with a constituting element that occurred in that
state's territory." Pierre Trudel, Jurisdiction Over the Internet: A Canadian Perspective, 32
INT'L LAw. 1027, 1036 (1998).
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United States,10 7 with courts often permitting United States drug
prosecutions for conduct that occurs outside this country when the
conduct could have a detrimental effect in this country.1°8 The mere
intent to commit an act in the United States has been sufficient for a
finding of extraterritorial application premised upon an objective
territorial principle.108
The nationality principle is premised upon the nationality of the
perpetrator. The United States seldom uses this principle to justify an
extraterritorial application. " An example of the United States applying
this principle to secure extraterritorial jurisdiction is found in a case
when the perpetrator, a United States citizen, is accused of making false
statements on a Customs Declaration form. Despite the fact that the act
occurred outside the United States, the prosecution could establish
extraterritoriality based upon the nationality of the accused."' This
principle is also used when a United States citizen commits a United
States tax offense while living outside this country.
Jurisdiction based on the nationality of the victim is the essence of the
passive personality principle. Because this principle allows the United
States to assume jurisdiction over an individual in another country
merely because the victim of the crime is a United States citizen, it has
been criticized for the "intrusion on sovereignty" of another state.13
Jurisdiction can also be premised upon a protective principle, "which
permits a nation to assert jurisdiction over a person whose conduct
outside the nation's territory threatens the nation's security or could
107 This principle is also recognized worldwide. See id. at 1035-36.
See, e.g., Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1311-13 (9th Cir. 1984)
(using objective territorial principle and protective principle as basis for United States
prosecution of extraterritorial narcotics offenses); United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833 (9th
Cir. 1976) (holding that prosecution in United States for distribution of heroin that occurred
in Japan is constitutional). The "effects test" is not limited to cases that are drug-related.
See Michael J. Calhoun, Comment, Tension on the High Seas of Transnational Securities Fraud:
Broadening the Scope of United States Jurisdiction, 30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 679 (1999) (discussing
use of "effects test" in cases of securities fraud).
0 United States v. Ricardo, 619 F.2d 1124, 1129 (5th Cir. 1980).
10 See Geoffrey R. Watson, Offenders Abroad: The Case for Nationality-Based Criminal
Jurisdiction, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 41, 83 (1992) (concluding that United States should not reject
use of nationality principle to acquire extraterritorial jurisdiction).
1 United States v. Walczak, 783 F.2d 852, 854 (9th Cir. 1986).
12 See United States v. Roberts, 1 F. Supp. 2d 601 (E.D. La. 1998) (applying passive
personality principle for charges of sexual abuse of minor where victim was U.S. citizen
and act was alleged to occur on board cruise ship).
003 See Geoffrey R. Watson, The Passive Personality Principle, 28 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 14-18
(1993) (discussing arguments used to oppose use of passive personality principle).
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potentially interfere with the operatioi of its governmental functions.' 1 4
Terrorism targeted against the defense department is an example of
criminal activity that falls under this principle.
Finally, matters of human rights often find extraterritorial jurisdiction
premised on the universality principle, a principle that permits
prosecution of "certain offenses recognized by the community of nations
as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or
hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of
terrorism."" 5
2. A Limit on Jurisdictional Bases
A limitation that is placed upon jurisdiction to prescribe is that of
reasonableness. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law §
114 United States v. Gonzalez, 776 F.2d 931, 938 (11th Cir. 1985).
115 United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see also Kenneth C.
Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785, 790-91
(1988)(arguing that states have right to assume universal jurisdiction over crimes listed in
coventions).
116 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 (1987):
§ 403 Limitations on Jurisdiction to Prescribe:
(1) Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under § 402 is present, a state may
not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity
having connections with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is
unreasonable.
(2) Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable is
determined by evaluating all relevant factors, including where appropriate:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the
extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has
substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity,
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the
activity to be regulated, or between that' state and those whom the
regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation
to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such
activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is
generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by
the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system;
University of California, Davis [Vol. 35:267
403 lists a host of factors that can be considered in assessing the
reasonableness of the jurisdiction to prescribe."7 For example, the "link
between the activity and the territory of the regulating state" needs to be
considered in determining whether the jurisdiction is reasonable. 118
Reasonableness is important to assure comity, the reciprocal respect for
another countries laws."9
Despite the importance, however, of the reasonableness standard, it
seldom serves to preclude a prosecution of drug activity occurring/' .- • 121
abroad.120 In Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Cal ornia, the Supreme Court
placed comity concerns as a consideration only if the court determined
that the statute did not cover the specific conduct 2 Constitutional
restraints also have not precluded findings of extraterritoriality in
criminal cases.12 Since the computer act is unlikely to be the result of a
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
(3) When it would not be unreasonable for each of two states to exercise
jurisdiction over a person or activity, but the prescriptions by the two states are
in conflict, each state has an obligation to evaluate its own as well as the other
state's interest in exercising jurisdiction, in light of all the relevant factors, in
Subsection (2); a state should defer to the other state if that state's interest is
clearly greater.
117 Id.
11' Id. at § 403(2)(a).
11 Id. at § 403(3).
'z There is a special approach to determining reasonableness when the case involves
drug activity. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Marsoner), 40 F.3d 959, 966 (9th Cir.
1994) (allowing United States interests to outweigh Austrian interests); United States v.
Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1515 (S.D. Fla. 1990) ("In assessing the reasonableness of
extraterritorial jurisdiction, one of the factors to be considered is 'the character of the
activity to be regulated, including the importance of regulation to the regulating state and
the degree to which the desire to regulate is generally accepted'." (quoting RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 403(1)(c) (1987))). But see United States v. Javino, 960
F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding it unreasonable to apply firearms statute to manufacturers
unless firearm is imported into United States); Boureslan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014, 1025
n.10 (5th Cir. 1988) (King, J., dissenting) ("No court has applied the reasonableness test as
part of the threshold inquiry to determine whether a statute may, as a general matter, be
applied extraterritorially.").
121 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
12 Id. at 797 n.24. (disagreeing with Justice Scalia's dissent that comity should factor
into determination whether Sherman Act applies to extraterritorial conduct).
12 1 NAT'L COMM'N ON REFORM OF FED. CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS 70 (1970)
International Computer Fraud
legislative or executive act of another country; the "act of state doctrine"
will not serve to limit extraterritoriality in the case of a computer
crime.' 24
3. Criminal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace
Applying these jurisdictional bases to cyberspace produces a result
that one does not find when these jurisdictional bases are used with
other substantive crimes. Most notable in this regard is the fact that a
single computer offense, even one prosecuted under the specific
computer fraud statute found in 18 U.S.C. § 1030, can be premised on a
variety of different jurisdictional bases.2'z Where the computer conduct
involves terrorism, the protective and universal principles might apply.
When an individual is filing a false United States government form via
computer, and that individual is outside the United States, nationality
may be the appropriate base for jurisdiction. Likewise, when a United
States citizen deliberately engages in criminal conduct beyond the
borders of this country in order to circumvent jurisdictional principles,
application of a nationality principle may be warranted.
Examining the jurisdictional bases as applied to computer conduct
provides a strong argument for using a "technologically neutral"
approach to the prosecution of computer crime. Seeing computers as
merely the means for the commission of the criminal conduct appears
warranted given the array of jurisdictional bases that might apply to
computer related conduct. Focusing on the conduct, as opposed to the
means in which the conduct is effectuated, would appear at first blush to
provide a fair and neutral method of determining whether there is
jurisdiction to prosecute in the United States'
[hereinafter REFORM WORKING PAPERS]; see also Michael D. Ramsey, Escaping "International
Comity", 83 IOWA L. REV. 893 (1998) (discussing extraterritorial legislation).
4 Id. at 914-17 (discussing "act of state" doctrine). The act-of-state doctrine is a
"common law principle that prevents U.S. courts from questioning the validity of a foreign
country's sovereign acts within its own territory." BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 35 (7th ed.
1999).
" A section of the computer fraud statute speaks to trafficking that "affects interstate
or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(6). This, however, is an element of the offense
necessary for a prosecution, as opposed to being a basis for proceeding with a prosecution
of conduct outside the United States. For example, the wire fraud statute requires as an
element of the offense that the communication be "in interstate or foreign commerce." 18
U.S.C. § 1343. Such a requirement, however, does not mean that this section automatically
authorizes every extraterritorial application. See United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580 (1st Cir.
1996) (refusing to allow wire fraud convictions where object of scheme was to defraud
foreign government).
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There is, however, a basic flaw in this analysis. To find jurisdiction
applicable based upon the conduct, irrespective of the use of a computer
to effectuate that conduct, disregards the unique nature of the means for
committing the crime.
4. Jurisdiction for Computer Fraud Prosecutions
Using computer fraud as an example, a computer fraud committed by
someone outside the United States could easily come under the objective
territoriality, nationality, passive personality, and protective principles.
The ease with which computer fraud acts outside the United States could
be prosecuted within this country is in large part because the medium,
the computer, has the ability to operate on a global network. It is
possible that the individual committing the act deliberately targeted
United States individuals, businesses, or the government. It can also be
the case that the perpetrator of the fraud had no knowledge of who
would be the recipients of his or her fraud. The individual committing
the act might have no intent to perpetrate an auction fraud on
individuals in the United States, but by placing the item for sale on the
web, he or she allows for individuals throughout the world to access that
information and thus be victims of the fraud.
Any computer act occurring outside the United States, where victims
of the crime are in the United States, may conceivably become subject to
United States prosecution under an objective territorial principle.
Because of the global nature of the medium, the objective territorial
doctrine could possibly be met by any act that might have a substantial
effect in this country. Unlike similar crimes that are premised upon the
means for committing the act, such as mail and wire fraud, the
jurisdiction for prosecuting a computer offense can easily be obtained in
the United States. Where the mails and wires are likely to have a set
number of participants in the activity, computers can have a limitless
number of individuals who can be victimized by the crime. Also, unlike
the mails and wires, the location where the perpetrator acts may be
masked by multiple links that may proceed through several countries
prior to a message being received by the victims. In the case of computer
fraud, if existing principles are adhered to, it would be rare to exclude an
extraterritorial prosecution as having an insufficient base for jurisdiction,
if individuals, the government, or businesses in the United States are
injured by the conduct of the perpetrator.126
26 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmt. d (1987):
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Requiring an intent to harm individuals in the United States might not
limit the United States' acquisition of jurisdiction to prosecute computer
crimes that are committed outside its borders.127 Because of the global
nature of cyberspace, intent could easily be inferred by the very fact that
the individual placed the item onto the Internet. A defendant could
hardly argue that they did not intend individuals from a certain country
to retrieve the message when the Internet by its very nature has global
possibilities. Additionally, issues of jurisdiction are rarely afforded a
mens rea requirement. The mere fact that the jurisdiction element is
satisfied and proof is present in court may be sufficient to meet the
venue and jurisdiction requirements of a statute.
Obviously, U.S. prosecutors will not choose to prosecute all computer
fraud offenses that occur in the international arena. For example, the
United States did not prosecute the individual alleged to be responsible
for the "I Love You" worm, despite damages in the billions.9
Discretion, a significant part of prosecutorial power can play a factor in
limiting the number of cases brought in this country. Resources can also
play a significant role, in that police, prosecutors, and judges do not have
(d) Effects principle. Jurisdiction with respect to activity outside the state,
but having or intended to have substantial effect within the state's territory,
is an aspect of jurisdiction based on territoriality, although it is sometimes
viewed as a distinct category. The effects principle is not controversial with
respect to acts such as shooting or even sending libelous publications across
a boundary. It is generally accepted with respect to liability for injury in the
state from products made outside the state and introduced into its stream of
commerce. Controversy has arisen as a result of economic regulation by the
United States and others, particularly through competition laws, on the
basis of economic effect in their territory, when the conduct was lawful
where carried out. This Restatement takes the position that a state may
exercise jurisdiction based on effects in the state, when the effect or
intended effect is substantial and the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable
under § 403....
127 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmt. d (1987):
... Cases involving intended but unrealized effect are rare, but international law
does not preclude jurisdiction in such instances, subject to the principle of
reasonableness. When the intent to commit the proscribed act is clear and
demonstrated by some activity, and the effect to be produced by the activity is
substantial and foreseeable, the fact that a plan or conspiracy was thwarted does
not deprive the target state of jurisdiction to make its law applicable.
' See, e.g., United States v. Bryant, 766 F.2d 370 (8th Cir. 1985) (finding that defendant
does not have to know whether wire transmission went interstate as long as it actually did
proceed interstate).
1" See Jovi Tanada Yam, Cybercrime Treaty Under Way, BUSINESSWORLD (Manila), May 3,
2001, at 9, available at 2001 WL 17164125.
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unlimited money and time to permit the prosecution of all crimes that
might meet the applicable criminal and jurisdiction requirements of
law.-13
Discretion, however, permits prosecutors to pick and choose those
offenses upon which they wish to proceed. Doctrines of fairness and
equity can be seriously undermined when the entire realm of computer
fraud offenses can be prosecuted, but prosecutors choose only a small
slice of the actions to proceed against. This problem is particularly
noteworthy when the prosecution is against individuals outside the
United States, who may not be accustomed to a similar discretionary
process in the charging of individuals for commission of crimes.
If one contrasts the use of international bases of jurisdiction in
computer fraud with the applications in another form of criminal
activity, such as the sale of drugs, the unique nature of computerization
is apparent. If someone sells drugs outside the United States with the
purpose of allowing the drugs to eventually be sold in this country, the
drug seller may not know the specific person who will receive the drugs.
Nevertheless, the individual clearly has the intent to sell drugs in the
United States and therefore meets the objective territorial principle for
the effect that the conduct has in this country. In contrast, computers
may not be targeted to a single country or to specific individuals within a
country. The very global nature of the means used in distributing the
criminal act places no limits on the territories in which the conduct can
be accessed, except to the extent a country limits incoming web sites or
people in the country lack the technology to access the fraudulent
conduct. A claim of "unreasonableness" in acquiring jurisdiction in the
United States stands little chance of success because the computer act
clearly can have a "substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in
131 The Reporter's Notes to § 403 of the Restatement confirm that:
Prosecutions for activities committed in a foreign state have generally been
limited to serious and universally condemned offenses, such as treason or traffic
in narcotics, and to offenses by or against military forces. In such cases the state
in whose territory the act occurs is not likely to object to regulation by the state
concerned.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 n.8. In recent years, however, the
United States has used its extraterritorial powers in prosecutions outside the realm of these
categories. See, e.g., United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., Ltd., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
1997) (discussing prosecution of corporation for antitrust violation where activities
occurred outside United States but had substantial effects in this country).
' Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of Prosecutors in Discretionary Decisions,
68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1511 (2000).
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the territory" of the United States. 32
C. A Proposed Federal Approach
Although Congress has addressed extraterritoriality in some federal133 . . .
statutes, there is no general extraterritorial jurisdiction provision in the
federal criminal code. In 1970, however, the National Commission on
Reform of Federal Criminal Law considered just such a provision.135 In
considering a possible general approach to extraterritoriality, the
National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Law provided a
model statute that premised extraterritorial jurisdiction upon a list of
conduct included within the statute.136  For example, presidential
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403(2)(a) (1987).
13 See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
1' See REFORM WORKING PAPERS, supra note 123, at 71 (1970).
' Id. at 69-76.
' NAT'L COMM'N ON REFORM OF FED. CRIMINAL LAW, FINAL REPORT § 208 (1971):
§ 208 Extraterritorial Jurisdiction.
Except as otherwise provided by statute or treaty, extraterritorial jurisdiction
over an offense exists when:
(a) on the following is a victim or intended victim of a crime or violence: the
President of the United States, the President-elect, the Vice-President, or, if
there is no Vice-President, the officer next in the order of succession to the
office of President of the United States, the Vice-President-elect, or any
individual who is acting as President under the Constitution and laws of the
United States, a candidate for President or Vice-President or any member or
member designate of the President's cabinet, or a member of Congress, or a
federal judge;
(b) the offense is treason, or is espionage or sabotage by a national of the
United States;
(c) the offense consists of a forgery or counterfeiting, or an uttering of
forged copies or counterfeits, of the seals, currency, instruments of credit,
stamps, passports, or public documents issued by the United" States; or
perjury or a false statement in an official proceeding of the United States; or
a false statement in a matter within the jurisdiction of the government of the
United States; or other fraud against the United States, or a theft of property
in which the United States has an interest, or, if committed by a national or
resident of the United States, any other obstruction of or interference with
United States government function;
(d) the accused participates outside the United States in a federal offense
committed in whole or in part within the United States, or the offense
constitutes an attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit a federal
offense within the United States;
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assassination would be subject to United States prosecution, irrespective
of whether the act occurred inside or outside the United States, and
irrespective of whether the individual committing the crime was a
United States citizen or alien.
137
A general jurisdiction statute that is conduct-related could prove
effective in limiting jurisdiction to specific activities. Since computer
criminality touches many types of conduct, such as terrorism, espionage
fraud, and theft, the computer would in essence be used as a means for
committing traditional crimes. When the traditional crimes are
specifically listed, and computer use to commit the crime is accounted
for in the wording of the statute, jurisdiction is not limitless. The
proposed statute of the National Commission on Reform of Federal
Criminal Law provided significant limits to the circumstances in which
prosecutors might proceed extraterritorially.135
If, however, the general jurisdiction provision were to mirror the
objective territorial principle in international law, thus placing
computers in a neutral setting with offenses that are not related to
technology, there would be few limits to what could be prosecuted in the
United States. A general provision of extraterritoriality based merely
upon whether the conduct affects individuals within the United States
would allow prosecutors to proceed whenever there were victims in this
country of the computer fraud.
(e) the offense is a federal offense involving entry of persons or property
into the United States;
(f) the offense is committed by a federal public servant who is outside the
territory of the United States because of his official duties or by a member of
his household residing abroad or by a person accompanying the military
forces of the United States;
(g) such jurisdiction is provided by treaty; or
(h) the offense is committed by or against a national of the United States
outside the jurisdiction of any nation.
See also REFORM WORKING PAPERS, supra note 123, at 69-76; Kenneth R. Feinberg,
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the Proposed Federal Criminal Code, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIM. 385
(1981) (noting that then-proposed federal criminal code codified existing case law).
137 See REFORM WORKING PAPERS, supra note 123, at 74.
138 Id.
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III. INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES AND PERSPECTIVES
There have been several groups and conferences focused on tackling
cybercrime through international cooperation.! Although one might
expect universal acceptance of all of these initiatives, scholars have noted
some significant deficiencies in some of these proposals. 140 This section
critically examines three perspectives on jurisdiction over cybercrime.
First, international proposals such as the recent Council of Europe
Draft Convention on Cybercrime provide a global approach to fighting
computer crimes. 4 1 Although the Council of Europe Draft Convention
on Cybercrime suggests ways to approach conflicts that might arise
between countries that are deciding which country will prosecute a
computer crime, this proposal does not limit existing ways for the United
States to secure extraterritorial jurisdiction. Another report, coming out
of a conference held at Stanford University, suggests modifications to the
Council of Europe Draft Convention on Cybercrime and provides a more
detailed approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction. Finally, using concepts
from the law of international space also suggests a way for handling
issues of jurisdiction with respect to computer crimes.
A. Council of Europe Draft Convention on Cybercrime
After an extensive study of cybercrime that included reviewing and
revising multiple drafts of a treaty, the Council of Europe Draft
Convention on Cybercrime publicly aired its conclusions. Non-member
nations, such as Canada, the United States, and Japan, participated in
" See supra note 12; see also Creating a Safer Information Society by Improving the
Security of Information Infrastructures and Combating Computer-Related Crime:
Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2000)890 final at
7-9 (discussing variety of international discussions and proposals on cybercrime), available
at http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/eif/InternetPoliciesSite/Crime/CrimeComm/EN.html.
There are also international discussions relating to considerations for an "international
standard instrument" for cyberspace. See, e.g., THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF
CYBERSPACE LAW (UNESCO, Law of Cyberspace Series Vol. 1, 2000) (examining issues
related to UNESCO-prepared articles on development of a possible international structure
for cyberspace).
... See generally ALDRICH, supra note 14 (examining efforts of European countries,
United States, and Japan to create international computer crime standards).
141 There have been many other international bodies that have been examining
cybercrime issues. See generally Michael A. Sussman, The Critical Challenges from
International High-Tech and Computer-Related Crime at the Millennium, 9 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 451, 476-88 (1999) (discussing multi-lateral organizations that have examined
computer crime issues).
2002]
University of California, Davis
many of the negotiations on this treaty.'4 Although the draft treaty
provides a section outlining how international cybercrime jurisdiction
questions ought to be resolved, the treaty provides few limitations to
existing principles governing United States extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Should this treaty become a reality, and should the United States become
a party to this treaty,143 the United States would still have the option to
proceed with a prosecution if national law permitted the action. The
treaty does offer the possibility that an increased number of countries
will add substantive and procedural provisions to combat computer
fraud related offenses, thus making it unnecessary for the United States
to intervene in the prosecution of these crimes. Many countries have
already moved toward the adoption of criminal laws that focus onS 144
computer crimes.
Jurisdiction under the proposed treaty includes four categories: "in its
territory," "on board a ship flying the flag," "on board an aircraft
registered under the laws of that Party," or "by one of it nationals if the
offence is punishable under criminal law where it was committed or if
the offence is committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of any
State."145 Countries, however, are not bound to accept these possible
1 Press Release, Council of Europe, First Draft of International Convention Released
for Public Discussion (Apr. 27,2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/
cybercrime/coepress.htm.
143 U.S. businesses have expressed concerns over this treaty. See U.S. Business Interests,
Rights Groups Still Dislike Internet Crime Treaty, 1 Cybercrime L. Rep. (P & F) No. 6, at 14
(June 4, 2001) (discussing three major concerns that businesses were expressing with regard
to this treaty).
"4 See generally Chief Judge Stein Schjolberg, The Legal Framework - Unauthorized Access
to Computer Systems, Penal Legislation in 41 Countries (outlining international developments
in computer-crime legislation and providing excerpts of such legislation currently in force
in 41 countries), available at http://www.mossbyrett.of.no.info/legal.htm1 (last modified
Oct. 1, 2001).
" Draft Convention, supra note 12, at §3, art. 22.
Article 22- Jurisdiction:
(1) Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be
necessary to establish jurisdiction over any offense established in accordance
with Articles 2 - 11 of this Convention, when the offence is committed:
(a) in its territory; or
(b) on board a ship flying the flag of that Party; or
(c) on board an aircraft registered under the laws of that Party; or
(d) by one of its nationals, if the offence is punishable under criminal law
where it was committed or if the offence is committed outside the territorial
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ways to attain jurisdiction. Thus, countries like the United States that
seldom premises jurisdiction upon a nationality principle14 could easily
ignore nationality as a base for acquiring jurisdiction. Significantly, the
draft treaty "does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in
accordance with domestic law."147 Although the treaty provides for the
resolution of conflicts between jurisdictions when multiple countries
have jurisdiction, it offers no constraints upon countries that might have
a legitimate basis for proceeding under their domestic law. The net
result is that the United States could easily proceed with a prosecution in
cases where the computer fraud significantly affects individuals in this
country. Thus, computer crimes occurring outside the United States may
nonetheless be subject to criminal prosecution by this country if the
crimes meet an objective territorial principle of jurisdiction and there is
no explicit language in the statute precluding an extraterritorial
application.
B. The Stanford Conference
The Council of Europe treaty is not the only international
consideration on how best to combat international computer crime.
Jointly sponsored by the Hoover Institution, The Consortium for
jurisdiction of any State.
(2) Each State may reserve the right not to apply or to apply only in specific cases
or conditions the jurisdiction rules laid down in paragraphs (1) b - (1) d of this
article or any part thereof.
(3) Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish
jurisdiction over the offences referred to in Article 24, paragraph (1) of this
Convention, in cases where an alleged offender is present in its territory and it
does not extradite him/her to another Party, solely on the basis of his/her
nationality, after a request for extradition.
(4) This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in
accordance with domestic law.
(5) When more than one Party claims jurisdiction over an alleged offense
established in accordance with this Convention, the Parties involved shall, where
appropriate, consult with a view to determining the most appropriate
jurisdiction for prosecution.
Id.
14 See Watson, supra note 110, and accompanying text.
... Draft Convention, supra note 12, at art. 22.
148 Id.
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Research on Information Security & Policy (CRISP) and the Center for
International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), a report titled "A
Proposal for an International Convention on Cybercrime and Terrorism" was
released in August 2000. This report is also referred to as the "Stanford
Draft International Convention to Enhance Security from Cybercrime
and Terrorism" (Stanford Draft). 49  The Stanford Draft calls for a
multilateral convention and states that "it builds upon the draft
Convention on Cybercrime proposed by the Council of Europe."' ° Like
the Council of Europe Report, it defines offenses and stresses
international cooperation in both the investigation and prosecution of
computer crimes. Unlike the Council of Europe treaty, however, the
Stanford Draft provides an explicit ordering of jurisdiction when
conflicts arise between countries. 151 Thus, the draft allows for
prosecution at the locus of the initial activity, as well as objective
territorial jurisdiction when the activity has a substantial effect on those
asserting jurisdiction within the country.
The Stanford Draft specifically comments on international fraud,• • 1. • 152
noting the array of potential places for jurisdiction. This draft report
states that nations have asserted jurisdiction of transnational fraud "on
the basis of any significant connection to the conduct involved."153 Since
cybercrime can easily involve multiple jurisdictions, the draft report
takes the position that enforcement here should "be limited to
cybercrimes that are universally condemned."'-94 The mere accessing of a
web site, for example, would probably not confer jurisdiction under this
proposal.
149 See Abraham D. Sofaer et al., A Proposal for an International Convention on Cyber Crime
and Terrorism (Aug. 2000), available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/engish/monograph.
htm. This Report was an outgrowth of a December 1999 conference held at Stanford
University. Id. at Executive Summary.
150 Id.
151 Id. at art. 5, § 4.
152 According to the commentary on the draft convention:
Among these are the States where a fraud was planned, where an effort to
defraud was initiated, where individuals worked at implementing the fraud,
where or through which communications were made that were intrinsic to the
fraud, where the victims were located, and where the fraud had material and
intended effects.
Id. at Commentary on the Draft Convention, 2. Jurisdiction.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
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.The specific ordering of which country would have priority in
prosecuting differentiates this Report from the Council of Europe Treaty.
The Stanford Draft lists the jurisdiction priorities as follows: (1) the
location where the alleged act was committed, (2) the place of substantial
harm, (3) nationality, (4) where the alleged offender is found, and (5) any
place with a "reasonable basis for jurisdiction."19 If this proposal is
accepted, it could alleviate some of the concerns that are expressed in
this Article. Specifically, an express list of jurisdictional priorities would
assist in restraining a prosecutor's discretion in deciding whether to
proceed with crimes that involve extraterritorial conduct.
C. International Space Jurisdiction
Attorney Darrel Menthe has suggested that perhaps cyberspace
should be analogized to jurisdiction in international space.'57 Under this
approach, the nationality of the perpetrator, as opposed to territoriality,
is the key component for determining jurisdiction in "outer space,
Antarctica, and the high seas.""s Numerous problems, however, can
arise if this approach is applied to computer fraud crimes. For example,
would the United States be willing to forego criminal prosecution when
the act occurred within its territory, but was committed by an individual
who was not a United States citizen? If both the United States and the
country to which the perpetrator was a national wanted to proceed with
a criminal prosecution, who would have priority? Is it practical to
proceed with a prosecution in another country when the initial act occurs
in the United States, the perpetrator is located within this country, and
all the evidence is located here?
These questions emphasize the differences between international
space and cyberspace. Where international space generally has no links
to any particular country, justifying the use of a nationality approach,
cyberspace can offer some distinct ties to a jurisdiction. 59  This is
Id. at art. 5, § 4.
See generally Darrel C. Menthe, Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: A Theory of International
Spaces, 4 MIcH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 69, 70 (1998) (discussing how jurisdiction theories
of international space would work in cyberspace);. see also Anna Maria Balsano, An
International Legal Instrument in Cyberspace? A Comparative Analysis with the Law of Outer
Space, THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF CYBERSPACE LAw (UNESCO, Law of Cyberspace
Series Vol. 1, 2000) (discussing comparisons and contrasts between cyberspace law and
outer space law).
' Menthe, supra, note 157, at 83.
' Another difference between cyberspace law and space law can be found in the
origins of these two forms of law. In contrast to cyberspace, which has an array of existing
national laws, "the regulation of outerspace activities does not originate from national
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especially true when the perpetrator commits the initial act within the
confines of a specific country that seeks to prosecute that person. When
there are specific links between the perpetrator of a cybercrime to a
particular jurisdiction, the use of a nationality approach, as employed in
outer space appears to be unnecessary. Thus, although the virtual nature
of cyberspace makes jurisdiction premised upon nationality a possible
consideration, as it has in the context of outer space, it is equally
important to remember that cyberspace can have connections to a
particular jurisdiction that might not be as evident in the context of
international space.
IV. RAMIFICATIONS OF EXTRATERRITORIAL PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL
COMPUTER FRAUD
Under existing norms, the five bases of international jurisdiction may
serve as different avenues that can be used to obtain jurisdiction for a
criminal prosecution in the United States. To permit jurisdictional
sufficiency, however, merely by having a prosecutor connect a line with
one of these international bases of jurisdiction raises both substantive
and procedural concerns. These concerns are particularly pronounced in
the areas of fraud, where the very global nature of the computer may
stretch the breadth of what will be considered a permissible place for
prosecution.
In looking at the substantive issues raised by permitting the United
States to prosecute computer fraud crimes occurring outside the country,
it is significant that there is a disparity among countries with respect to
levels of available technology. This disparity creates questions as to
whether United States punishment theories will be successful in
preventing future computer fraud crimes that are occurring in less
advanced countries. Further, the overlapping approach to fraud in the
United States, with acts crossing into both civil and criminal spheres, is
not mirrored in all countries. Thus, what may be considered criminal in
the United States may not be criminal in another country. Additionally,
the imposition of the United States penal system on individuals who
reside and act outside the United States raises both political and legal
questions.
Procedural issues can also arise in the context of prosecuting
extraterritorial computer fraud crimes. Cybercrime places law
enforcement in a new realm that is filled with obstacles that impede the
laws." See Balsano, supra note 57, at 141.
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detection of criminal conduct. For example, the anonymity of most
cyber-criminals can play a role in limiting the ability of police to discern
the perpetrator of the crime.W This problem of tracing the perpetrator
can impede the determination of what is the appropriate jurisdiction for
proceeding with a prosecution. Equally problematic is securing the
individual and the evidence necessary to prosecute the crime. For
example, law enforcement must consider whether it is acceptable for the
United States to abduct a person from another country in order to
prosecute them for a computer fraud act.
This sampling of substantive and procedural issues that can accrue by
a loose extraterritorial policy in the United States is not, in all cases,
exclusive to computer fraud acts. For example, there have been
criticisms in other contexts related to the government's kidnapping and
luring of individuals into the United States. This problem has been
particularly apparent in the prosecution of individuals charged with
drug offenses. In the contexts where there is already debate over
problematic practices such as kidnapping and luring, the use of these
same practices in the computer fraud context may not present unique
issues. The breadth of people and places, however, that can become
subject to United States jurisdiction in cases of criminal computer fraud
can amplify existing problems.
A. Punishment
The use of criminal law, as opposed to civil actions, is to a large extent
predicated on the appropriateness of punishment. After all, "a person
convicted of a crime is punished." 161  Whether one approaches
punishment from a retributive or utilitarian perspective, there is still the
question of the propriety of punishing conduct that occurred
extraterritorially. If another country does not punish the activity, should
the United States use its enforcement powers to stop the individual who
is outside the United States but harming individuals within this
country? 62
Although the World Wide Web has reached a level of globalization,
governments have not. Countries may operate in international
" See Charney & Alexander, supra note 18, at 942 ("One important feature of the
Internet is the availability of anonymous communications.").
161 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 1 (3d ed. 2001).
16 See Patrick J. Fitzgerald, The Territorial Principle in Penal Law: An Attempted
Justification, 1 GA. J. OF INT'L & COMP. L. 29 (1970) (discussing justifications for territorial
principle using punishment theory).
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commerce; they may even participate in international treaties and
support international initiatives that serve to address a wide array of
world problems. This type of global activity does not, however, carry
over into enforcing the criminal laws of individual countries.
Basic notions of justice require that individuals need to know of the
existence of the criminal laws, unless the law is of a strict liability nature.
To punish without knowledge of the criminality does not comport with
the essence of modem punishment theories. One cannot deter conduct
that a perpetrator does not know to be criminal, nor can one rehabilitate
an individual, unless they are aware of the criminality of their actions.
To permit rehabilitation and deterrence to emanate solely from the
punishment, rather than from the knowing violation of that criminal act,
deprives the perpetrator of due process. It seems odd that a progressive
country, such as the United States, would resort to punishing computer
fraud acts outside the country of individuals who had not been privy to
a criminal structure that deemed the activity wrong.
Likewise, one cannot say that criminal computer fraud is inherently
wrong and therefore subject to automatic criminal status.113 If this
proposition were true, than all countries would have realized the
inherent criminal nature of computer fraud and prohibited the conduct
in their criminal code. The reality, however, is that countries do not
always criminalize fraudulent computer conduct. Moreover, even if they
do, countries do not necessarily criminalize the conduct in the same
manner as it is prohibited in the United States.16
To some degree, whether a particular activity reaches the level of
fraud can be determined by a community standard. What may be fraud
in one community could be accepted practice in another community. For
example, in United States v. Brown,6' the defendants faced charges of mail
fraud for their alleged selling of real estate at high prices. Circuit Judge
Edmundson found that although the defendants might have engaged in
"sharp conduct, manipulative acts, or unethical transactions," this
conduct did not amount to fraud for purposes of the mail fraud statute.'66
Looking at this real estate transaction in the context of the "openness of
16 See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 149 (1994) (holding that defendant must
know that structuring of monetary transaction was unlawful conduct).
1" For example, the Philippines did not prohibit the conduct surrounding the "I Love
You" virus until one month after the incident. See Yam, supra note 129, at 9 (discussing
how Philippine Congress passed Electronic Commerce Law, which prohibited this conduct,
one month later).
79 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1996).
6 Id. at 1562.
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the Florida real estate market," the court found no violation of the fraud
statutes. 67
If alleged fraud is placed in the context of a computer crime, what is
the community standard that should be used to determine whether the
conduct is in fact fraudulent? Will it be the community of Internet users,
the community from which the perpetrator comes, or the community of
the victims?'6 There is, obviously, no easy answer. The unavailability of
a clear answer militates against the United States imposing punishment
on persons who operate under community standards very different from
our own.
B. The Merging of Civil and Criminal Fraud
The standards adopted to regulate civil computer activity are not
necessarily applicable to criminal activities. This differentiation exists in
part because the presumption of innocence and the reasonable doubt
burden accorded the criminally accused does not match that used in civil
cases. Civil wrongs do not entail jail time, are not premised on the same
punishment theories, and do not carry the stigma that is associated with
criminal penalties. Where individuals bring civil actions, the state or
• . • 169
federal government is the source of a criminal prosecution.
Additionally, constitutional amendments provide individuals with
certain protections in criminal matters, such as the prohibition against
double jeopardy.
Fraud is peculiar in that it crosses into both the civil and criminal
areas. Fiduciary wrongs and the deprivation of the right to honest
services might be the subject of a civil action, administrative hearing, or
criminal charge. For example, a tax fraud or securities fraud may result
in a criminal prosecution, or alternatively in administrative penalties.
Individual prosecutors in the United States often have the choice of the
forum in which to proceed.
Determining what constitutes a criminal fraud also presents problems.
The breadth of the concept permits generic fraud statutes to encompass a
wide array of conduct. Criminal fraud prosecutions that at one time
167 Id.
'6 See generally William S. Byassee, Jurisdiction of Cyberspace: Applying Real World
Precedent to the Virtual Community, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 197, 200-02 (1995) (providing an
overview of different communities in cyberspace).
" See generally Edward M. Wise, International Crimes and Domestic Criminal Law 38
DEPAUL L. REV. 923, 923-924 (1989) (discussing distinction between civil and criminal
actions).
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were limited to public wrongs have now extended into prosecutions of
private individuals who have wronged other private parties.1 70
Because different types of fraud conduct are not uniquely criminal in
all jurisdictions, it is important to recognize this diversity of views in
approaching extraterritorial prosecution. National prosecution for
conduct occurring outside this country is more suspect if the country
where the conduct occurs does not penalize the activities of the
individual.
C. Imposing United States Law on Other Nations
Substantive laws may differ among countries.17 1 What may be legal in
one country may not in fact present a violation of community norms in
another country. The prosecution of technology related offenses that are
initiated in countries outside the United States raises concerns when one
is imposing the community norms of the United States on these other
countries. It is easy to meet the "affect" test for extraterritorial criminal
jurisdiction, but is this where the United States should place its criminal
justice resources and exposure?i7 This question may implicate the
resolution of jurisdiction issues with respect to all computer crimes.
Take, for example, the phenomenon of Internet gambling. The United
States gaming industry may now include international sports betting
and other Internet gaming activities that are legal in the country where
the conduct is initiated. Clearly, the medium of the. Internet permits
online gambling to be accessible in countries that do not legalize gaming
activity. Does this accessibility alone amount to sufficient jurisdiction for
prosecution? Do individuals operating the online gambling need to
secure a license in all countries in which the item may be accessed?
Should 18 U.S.C. §1084, a statute that regulates wagering, be used for
prosecuting conduct that originally begins outside this country?
Imposing United States legal standards of fraud on individuals in other
countries may not be welcomed in all countries.
0 John C. Coffee, Modern Mail Fraud: The Restoration of the Public/Private Distinction, 35
AM. CRiM. L. REv. 427 (1998).
17 The money-laundering laws of the United States are not replicated in all countries.
See Bruce Zagaris, A Brave New World: Recent Developments in Anti-Money Laundering and
Related Litigation Traps for the Unwary in International Trust Matters, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L.
1023 (1999) (discussing international initiatives to combat money laundering).
" Bruce Zagaris, Technology Trumps the Law in International Gaming, Gaming
Enforcement II, Am. Bar Assoc. Cntr. For Continuing Legal Educ., N98GENB ABA -
LGLED C-21, C-54 (1998).
[Vol. 35:267
International Computer Fraud
One may argue that technologically advanced and better financed
countries are in a better position to proceed with a prosecution and
should therefore assume the role of world prosecutor. One may also
argue that permitting an expansive policy of extraterritoriality will result
in forum shopping, where each country involved can look for the place
with the law most favorable for its side.'73  Countries that wish to
mutually agree on who should proceed with a prosecution will not be
precluded from taking this posture by limiting United States
extraterritorial jurisdiction. Agreements between countries that foster
international relations are encouraged by limiting extraterritorial
jurisdiction. Permitting, however, country shopping that is contested by
the home jurisdiction of the individual suspected of committing the
crime, raises questions of whether international comity is truly being
applied.
Extraterritoriality can be a political decision with political
ramifications. A negative aura can be associated with assertions of
extraterritorial application that assumes jurisdiction over individuals in
other countries.! Ultimately, this unwelcome assertion of jurisdiction
can seriously implicate foreign policy.
D. Constitutional Considerations
Constitutional and legal rights may also play a factor in how
criminality is treated in countries outside the United States. There have
been constitutional concerns with regard to privacy rights and First
Amendment issues. Other constitutional considerations that can
influence a United States prosecution include issues involving search
and seizure and self-incrimination. 75
The level of privacy afforded to citizens is not a consistent norm
among the countries of this world. Governmental practices of
monitoring individual systems can differ.' 76 One does not always find
See generally Symposium, Post-Cold War International Security Threats: Terrorism,
Drugs, and Organized Crime, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 527,663 (2000).
" See Brilmayer, supra note 85, at 21 ("There are two sources of dissatisfaction with
American expansionist tendencies, one practical and one theoretical."); Joseph P. Griffin,
Foreign Governmental Reactions to U.S. Assertions of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 6 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 505, 505 (1998) ("Foreign governments have reacted with vehemence towards the
extraterritorial enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws in a number of circumstances.").
'r See WISE & PODGOR, supra note 2, at 243-82.
176 See Suzanne Daley, French Prosecutor Investigates U.S. Global Listening System, N.Y.
TIMES, July 5, 2000, at A9 (discussing French investigation of U.S. "Echelon" electronic
surveillance system).
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comparable First Amendment rights as one finds in the United States.
The Internet clearly complicates the right of privacy and the extent to
which privacy rights can protect Internet conduct.'7 Although the
Council of Europe recommended "guidelines for the protection of
individuals with regard to the collection and processing of personal data
on informational highways,"'78 one cannot be assured that these
recommendations will be adhered to by other countries throughout the
world.
Examining the issue of imposing one nation's laws on another nation
in a reverse scenario highlights the possible national ramifications of
permitting extensive extraterritorial prosecutions. For example, in some
countries, a persons' speech may constitute criminal conduct, said
conduct being perfectly legal within the United States.' 79 Are we willing
to accept the extraterritorial jurisdiction of that country to prosecute
United States citizens for speech committed over the Internet? Will we
authorize extradition of United States citizens for fraud related conduct
that is not considered fraud in this country or is protected by the First
Amendment? The imposition of United States law on citizens of another
country can have repercussions if foreign countries decide to prosecute
United States citizens for activity occurring within the United States.
E. Identity
Traditional crimes are not inundated with issues of identity once an
individual has been charged with a crime. In the context of traditional
crimes, identity questions occur in instances where the perpetrator is
unknown and the crime remains unsolved, or the crux of the defense
centers on whether the defendant did in fact commit this offense. In
cybercrime, however, merely discerning and proving the identity of the
17 See Eugene Volokh, Cyberspace and Privacy: A New Legal Paradigm?, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1049, 1050-51 (2000) (discussing "information privacy" and free speech).
78 Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers to Member States for the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to the Collection and Processing of Personal Data on Information
Highways, Recommendation No. R(99)5 (adopted Feb. 23, 1999), available at
http://www.coe.fr/dataprotection/rec/elignes.htm.
79 See German and U.S. Clash Over Efforts to Crack Down on Neo-Nazi Web Sites in the U.S.,
17 Int'l Enforcement L. Rep. No. 2, at 91 VI.A.64 (Feb. 2001) (discussing controversy between
United States and Germany in that Germany wishes to "crack down extraterritorially on
Neo-Nazi hate crimes" and United States wishes to maintain individuals First Amendment
rights within United States), see also Yahoo!, Inc., v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et
L'Antisenitisme, 2001 WL 1381157, at *9-10 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (ruling that Yahoo! was not
subject to French laws criminalizing auctioning of Nazi memorabilia, when conduct was
protected by First Amendment).
[Vol. 35:267
International Computer Fraud
perpetrator can be a significant problem for law enforcement.
The anonymity of the person committing the act may be difficult to
detect in the trail left throughout the world.18° Anonymity places a
greater burden on the government to discern the source of the criminal
conduct in order to find not only the appropriate person to prosecute,
181but also the appropriate place for this prosecution. Countries need to
be encouraged to pursue transgressions of the law, despite the fact that
the results of the investigation may not produce a prosecution in the
jurisdiction doing the investigation. Increased international cooperation,
in both the investigation and procurement of evidence, can assist in this
regard. Limitations on national jurisdiction need to be mindful of the
problems that can arise when a perpetrator acts anonymously.
Even if the source of the conduct is detected, substantive legal
questions can still arise as to who will be liable for the criminal conduct.
Will it be limited to the person who initially places the item onto the
Internet? Will it include individuals who receive the-item and then pass
it on to others? Will we use conspiratorial liability to go after the
Internet Service Provider for allowing the fraudulent conduct to continue
to persist on the Internet? The new medium for the crime raises a host of
substantive and procedural issues that may implicate the ability to
prosecute the person or persons committing the offense. Equally
problematic here is that differing laws may offer a host of different
resolutions to these questions.
F. Kidnapping and Luring the Perpetrator to the United States
Bringing computer crimes under United States jurisdiction opens the
door to procedural actions to secure the individual's presence in the
United States. Although extradition presents a formal legal process for
obtaining the accused, it is only one source used to procure defendants
who are outside the United States. The United States has also used
kidnapping and luring to obtain individuals to answer charges levied
against them. These informal processes can avoid adherence to the Rule
of Specialitys2 dual criminality,' pledges against using the death
" See generally George du Pont, The Criminalization of True Anonymity in Cyberspace, 7
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 191 (2001) (discussing ongoing development of law
governing anonymity in cyberspace), available at http://www.mttlr.org/volseven/duPont.
html.
' See Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1750 (1995) ("The
ability to appear invisibly on a network and slander, or harass or assault, certainly will
increase the incidence of those on the network who slander, or harass or assault.").
" See United States v. Lui Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 113 (1st Cir. 1997) ("Speciality has
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penalty,8 4 and extradition precluded by the political offense exception.18
The use of abduction to obtain defendants has been used in the United
States186 despite the fact that this practice may be in violation of "general
international law principles" and may be "shocking."
187
The actions of the United States in procuring individuals to stand trial
for drug related offenses shows the importance of limiting jurisdiction
and limiting discretion prior to computer crimes becoming a new top
priority of United States prosecutors. For example, in United States v.
Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court allowed the abduction of a
defendant doctor from Guadalajara, Mexico, who was "indicted for
participating in the kidnap and murder" of a drug enforcement agent
and Mexican pilot. The government did not use extradition to obtain the
accused, despite the existence of a United States and Mexico Extradition
Treaty. Because the treaty did not preclude forcible abductions, the
Court permitted the government's actions.18 Indeed, there are few
instances in which the courts have used their supervisory powers to
restrict the government's use of kidnapping and luring to secure the
presence of individuals for trial.190
Computer offenses are not immune to aggressive police action in
instances of alleged international criminal activity. Recently, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation established an undercover operation in the
United States in order to "snare Russian hackers."' 91 In addition to
two basic components. First, the requesting state may not try the fugitive for any crimes
other than the specific crime for which extradition was sought and granted. Second, the
requesting state may not re-extradite the fugitive to a third state.").
'" Dual criminality requires the crime to be a serious crime and to have a comparable
crime in the jurisdiction that the defendant is being extradited from. See In re Extradition of
Russell, 789 F.2d 801, 803 (9th Cir. 1986).
' See generally WISE & PODGOR, supra note 2, at 477-95.
See Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 791 (9th Cir. 1986) (discussing parameters of
political offense exception).
" See, e.g., United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 1997) (defendant abducted
from Panama); United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1995) (defendant
abducted from Honduras).
187 See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 669 (1992).
188 Id.
189 The doctor in this case was acquitted at his trial. See Alvarez-Machain v. United
States, 107 F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing case of Dr. Alvarez-Machain for charges he
filed under the Federal Tort Claims and Torture Victim Protection Acts).
' See United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
191 Bogus FBI Company Snares Russian Hackers; Indictments Follow in Connecticut,
Washington, and California, 1 Cybercrime L. Rep. (P & F) No. 7, at 7 (July 2, 2001) (discussing
federal indictment of Russians on "charges for breaking into computer systems, stealing
credit card information, and attempting to extort payments from victim companies in
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luring the defendants to the United States, the FBI used a computer
program that permitted them to record keystrokes of the defendants in
order to obtain significant data from the use of their computers.
Increased extraterritorial prosecution of computer fraud actions raise
flags as to whether practices of luring and kidnapping will become
prevalent in this new aspect of the law. With increasing public pressure
on curtailing fraud activity, promoting comity may be second seated to
practices that would allow the United States to dominate the role of
prosecutor of computer related offenses.
V. LIMITING EXTRATERRITORIAL PROSECUTION OF COMPUTER FRAUD
In anticipation of increased computer fraud criminal activity that
extends beyond the borders of the United States, it is important to
consider appropriate ways to temper national jurisdiction to properly
address the criminality but also avoid the possible ramifications,
outlined above, of an expansive policy. Congressional recognition of this
issue is a first step in the process. By addressing the extraterritorial
prosecution of computer fraud crimes in existing or new statutes, a
definitive congressional intent would be apparent. Alternatively, there
needs to be reconsideration of how objective territoriality applies in the
context of computer crimes. What will be considered a reasonable
connection for cybercrime fraud jurisdiction may likewise assist in
reigning in unlimited and unmonitored prosecutorial discretion.
A. Specific Congressional Language
Modifying 18 U.S.C. § 1030 to consider its extraterritorial application
in the specific context of computer fraud acts would certainly assist in
providing a clear congressional indication of when it is proper to
prosecute conduct occurring outside the United States. The very nature
of this statute would allow for consideration of extraterritoriality with
respect to each aspect of the statute. Thus, a modified § 1030 would
differentiate between crimes that involved the protection of the United
States and crimes that focused on consumers within this country. The
act of a terrorist breaking into a government computer may warrant an
extraterritorial application, as the legislature appears to consider it such
in its recent amendment that authorizes extraterritorial application
where the computer outside the United States "affects interstate or
exchange for computer security services").
192 Id.
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foreign commerce or communication of the United States." But where
the perpetrator of a crime produces a fraudulent online auction that is
intended for consumers in countries outside the United States,
extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction may not be needed. Placing specific
jurisdictional language in the statute would allow Congress to make the
choice of when an extraterritorial criminal application might be proper
and when individuals should be left to pursue their private civil
remedies.
Congress could also define certain situations in which an "intent to
affect" the United States might be a basis for consideration in deciding
issues of jurisdiction. For example, Congress could include acts by
individuals who deliberately try to evade federal prosecution by
committing a computer act outside the United States. Thus, a
perpetrator who leaves this country to commit a computer crime in a
country that permits the conduct could not avoid criminal prosecution in
the United States. In contrast, individuals who intend their
communication for a specific jurisdiction might not be subjected to
prosecution by every other possible jurisdiction.
Obviously, congressional clarification in the computer fraud statute
will not curtail all extraterritorial applications for computer fraud crimes.
Prosecutors still have other statutes, such as wire fraud, that can be used
to circumvent extraterritorial restrictions that might be placed in the
computer fraud statute. One hopes that courts will not allow innovative
prosecutorial charging that is used to circumvent criminal conduct that
Congress sought to restrict.
193
B. Reconfiguring Objective Territoriality
Objective territoriality requires that the activity result in a substantial
effect on the United States. Permitting extraterritorial jurisdiction
whenever the conduct has a substantial effect on the United States offers
few limitations when the medium for the crime is a computer. After all,
the economic effects on both individuals and businesses by a juvenile
hacker can be enormous. Requiring a substantial effect on the United
State government, as opposed to a substantial effect on individual
citizens, could differentiate between acts that are focused on the general
public and acts that have disadvantages to individuals.
" See, e.g., United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1991) (prohibiting use of
conspiracy statute to circumvent exclusion of foreign officials in Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act).
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United States v. Bowman provides some useful language that draws
clear lines for extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction. In Bowman, the
Supreme Court notes that "[cirimes against private individuals or their
property, like assaults, murder, burglary, larceny, robbery, arson
embezzlement and fraud of all kinds, which affect the peace and good
order of the community, must of course be committed within the
territorial jurisdiction of the government." The Court contrasts these
crimes against private individuals with crimes against the government.
Although Bowman uses language regarding crimes "not logically
dependent on their locality," language that might serve to include all
computer acts and its separation of private and governmental crimes is
an important distinction that can serve as a model for limiting the
objective territorial principle.
It will not diminish the effectiveness of our criminal process to leave to
another country the option of proceeding with criminal charges in
instances where private individuals in the United States are victims of a
fraud. Individuals committing acts here would still be subject to
criminal punishment. Likewise, individuals who deliberately leave the
country to commit a fraud on United States citizens could face
prosecution by the United States. Finally, individuals who are not
prosecuted in another country could face civil action by the individual or
business that are the victims of the perpetrator's actions.
C. Enforcing the Reasonableness Doctrine
Alternatively, the courts could adhere strictly to the "reasonableness"
standards set forth in section 403 of the Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States. Section 403 places issues of
comity at the forefront of considerations of whether extraterritorial
application is warranted.194 Allowing a prosecution merely because it is
not specifically excluded by a treaty places few limits on what will be
considered reasonable.
The "reasonableness" standard needs to be examined contextually,
and not applied merely in the abstract. Courts need to assess
"reasonableness" not merely by examining the specific language of the
19 Justice Scalia took this position in his dissenting opinion in Hartford Fire Insurance Co.
v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 817-18 (1993), a civil case that considered international law
principles in deciding whether the Sherman Act should be applied extraterritorially.
Justice Scalia, however, joined the majority in Alvarez-Machain in permitting the abduction
of an individual from Mexico despite its implications to international law. United States v.
Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 669 (1992).
2002]
University of California, Davis
regulation, but by also considering the ramifications of permitting the
prosecution. Allowing a prosecution when the abduction of the
defendant may be "shocking" and possibly in "violation of general
international law principles" hardly considers the reasonableness of
implementing the applicable law. Public pressure to curtail criminal
activity should not be the motivating factor for permitting an
extraterritorial prosecution.
By adopting both an abstract and contextual examination of
"reasonableness," one can focus on all aspects of having the specific
conduct prosecuted in the United States. In the context of computer
fraud, this approach would allow for reflecting on factors such as
whether the crime would in fact be punishable in the place where the
individual committed the act. This approach would also permit
considerations of how the prosecution might affect issues of
international comity. Applying a "reasonableness" standard to both the
conduct, the intent of the individual, the country where it occurred, and
the rules of that country would serve to reinforce general principles of
punishment that operate in the United States. Merely having a
substantial effect on individuals in the United States would not be a
controlling factor in the decision to pursue extraterritorial prosecution.
Courts can appropriately make distinctions between transgressions
involving computer fraud and those involving computer terrorism, with
the latter being considered a more likely candidate for extraterritorial
criminal prosecution.
CONCLUSION
Will restrictions on the United States prosecution of computer crimes
mean that some individuals will not be punished for their commission of
computer crimes outside the United States? Will limiting the breadth of
national jurisdiction mean that victims of computer fraud in the United
States may not be satisfied ,that our penal system is deterring future
activities? The answer to both of these questions is yes. There will be
instances where countries do not have sufficient laws to properly punish
individuals, where countries will decide not to prosecute these
individuals, and where people will not be punished for crimes that affect
individuals in the United States.
Hopefully, users of computers in the United States will become
educated to these possibilities and act with some skepticism when
19 See Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 669.
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operating in the global marketplace. 96  Certainly, existing and future
technology can be used to advise those in the marketplace on how to be
aware of and avoid fraudulent activities.197  Likewise, international
initiatives may provide a future avenue for relieving some of the
ramifications of not having the United States dominate the criminal
justice spectrum. The United States has moved in this direction in
another context by trying to persuade other countries to adopt anti-
bribery laws similar to our Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 98
Clearly, law enforcement needs to be bolstered to deal with new and
developing technologies.' In this regard, joint measures between law
enforcement and private industry have already made many inroads.
2m
Continued efforts in the international sphere can certainly assist. In the
meantime, however, the U.S. law enforcement should tread carefully in
imposing its jurisdiction throughout the world. It is one thing to lead the
charge in prosecuting international computer fraud crimes; it is another,
however, to take charge. Until sufficient international measures are
operational, it is important for the United States to remind itself that it is
not the world's police, prosecutor and court.
Computer users are likely to be more sophisticated in the faults of technology and
the possibilities of fraud in the marketplace. See Rice, supra note 98, at 586 (discussing how
American Bar Association Project on Cyberspace noted that "Internet, in many ways, has
engendered a breed of 'super-consumers' that should be viewed on par with business
customers").
" See Steven Salbu, Information Technology in the War Against International Bribery and
Corruption: The Next Frontier of Institutional Reform, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 67 (2001)
(discussing monitoring of criminal bribery activity through use of information technology);
see also Challenges Posed by Cross-Border Fraud on Internet Lead to International Effort, 1
Cybercrime L. Rep. (P & F) No. 3, at 6 (May 7, 2001). New linking of databases may also
assist in fighting computer fraud. See Markup of Anti-Fraud Database Bill Delayed Over Due
Process Concerns, 1 Cybercrime L. Rep. (P & F) No. 4, at 10 (May 21, 2001); Reps. Rogers,
Oxley Introduce Legislation to Link Government Antifraud Databases, 1 Cybercrime L. Rep. (P &
F) No. 2, at 9 (Apr. 23, 2001).
' See Transnational Bribery: Effort to Implement OECD Anti-Corruption Convention
Continues, 16 Int'l Enforcement L. Rep. XIV, A, at 753 (May 2000).
199 See Cybercrime: Special Joint Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Criminal
Justice Oversight Subcommittee and House Judiciary Committee, Crime Subcommittee, 106" Cong.
(Feb. 29, 2000) (statement of Michael A. Vatis, Director, National Infrastructure Protection
Center, Federal Bureau of Investigation) (discussing need to keep "law enforcement on the
cutting edge of cyber crime"), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime
/vatis.htm; Marc S. Friedman & Kristin Bissinger, 'Infojacking': Crimes on the Information
Superhighway, 9 PROPRIETARY RTS. 2, 10 (May 1997) ("Another hurdle facing prosecutors
and investigators of computer crime is their lack of technical understanding and
experience."); see also Greg Farrell, Police Have Few Weapons Against Cyber-Criminals, USA
TODAY, Dec. 6, 2000, at 5B; Charney & Alexander, supra note 22 at 944 - 47 (discussing the
need for more law enforcement training).
' See Gonzalez Statement, supra, note 65 (discussing private-sector cooperation).

